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The Constitutional Court Reviews the
Early Dissolution of the West German
Parliament
By MARY LovIK*
B4., Pomona College, 1976; M4., Hariard University, 1979; J.D., Hastings
College of the Law, 1982; Member of the California Bar;Associate, Rogers
and Wells, San Diego, CA.
Constitutional scholars in the Federal Republic of Germany will
long remember the early dissolution of the West German parliament
(Bundestag) in December 1982, which took place in order to make way
for new elections in March 1983. Although dissolution of the parlia-
mentary body for the purpose of holding elections prior to the expira-
tion of the regular legislative session is done as a matter of course in
some nations,' the dissolution of the Bundestag in December 1982 was
only the second time such an event had occurred during the thirty-four
year history of the Federal Republic.2 In light of the 1949 Bonn Consti-
tution (Grundgesetz)3 and its severely restrictive provisions regarding
early dissolution, the legality of the December dissolution was the sub-
ject of lively debate. Indeed, many legal scholars thought that dissolu-
tion was a manipulation of the Bonn Constitution. The issue was
ultimately submitted to the Federal Constitutional Court
(Bundesverfassungsgericht), which upheld the constitutionality of the
proceedings.4
* This article was completed in 1982-83 while the author was a Fulbright Scholar at
the University of Heidelberg, West Germany. The author expresses thanks to the Fulbright
Commission in the Federal Republic of Germany for its financial support and to the Max
Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, Heidelberg, for giving
the author access to its excellent research facilities.
1. In Austria, for example. See infra text accompanying note 158.
2. The other early dissolution occurred in 1972. See infra text accompanying note 52.
3. The Grundgesetz, or "Basic Law," is the present constitution of the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany.
4. Judgment of Feb. 11, 1983, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVERFG]. 1983
EUROPA1SCHE GRUNDRECHTE ZEITSCHRIFT [EuGRZ] 57. Shortened versions are found in
1983 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJWI 735; 1983 DIE OFFENTUtCHE VERtWAL-
TUNG [DbV] 236; 1983 JURISTENZErrUNG [JZ] 244. All references to the court's decision in
this article will be taken from the EuGRZ.
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This Article investigates the legal issues raised by the early disso-
lution, and the Constitutional Court's February 1983 decision as to its
constitutionality. The study also examines possible constitutional
amendment in the wake of the court's decision.
In the first section of the Article, background information neces-
sary to an understanding of the court's decision is presented. The
unique West German "constructive vote of no-confidence" which led
to the change in government in September 1982 is explained in the
context of its historical background. Related provisions on dissolution
are also discussed; of particular interest is the "vote of confidence" pro-
vision used in 1982 to bring about the desired end to the legislative
session.
The second section discusses the Federal Constitutional Court's
decision reviewing the early dissolution. As the Constitutional Court
has no real counterpart in the United States judicial system, discussion
of the decision is prefaced by a short comparative digression explaining
the court's exercise of subject-matter jurisdiction in the case. The
court's majority and separate opinions are then described in detail.
The concluding section examines prospects for constitutional
change. Several proposals have been made which would amend the
Bonn Constitution to permit easier dissolution. The most important
proposals are presented, with comparative glances at West Germany's
neighbors.
This Article is intended to present an important milestone in the
postwar West German experience with democracy to English speaking
readers. Consideration of the court's judgment and of the events lead-
ing up to it provides a stimulating study not only for lawyers and legal
scholars, but also for political scientists, historians, and students of
comparative law. For political scientists, investigation of the dissolu-
tion illuminates the contemporary West German political scene and the
political practices that are developing under the Bonn Constitution.
Historians will find that the controversy provides insight into West
Germany's efforts to build a democratic society after its nightmarish
experience with National Socialism. For students of comparative law,
the judgment of the Constitutional Court illustrates the court's methods
of constitutional interpretation and its unique powers of judicial review
with respect to the political branches of government.
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I. POLITICAL BACKGROUND AND LEGAL ISSUES
A. The End of an Era
On October 1, 1982, the social/liberal coalition that had been gov-
erning the Federal Republic since 1969 lost its majority in the
Bundestag and was replaced by a new political partnership. The
change ended thirteen years of cooperation between the social-demo-
cratic Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) and the small
liberal Freie Demokratische Partel (FDP). The SPD/FDP coalition,
first led by Chancellor Willy Brandt (SPD) and since 1974 by Helmut
Schmidt (SPD), espoused policies which, like those of other western
governments during the late sixties and seventies, were characterized
by expanding state spending for social programs and detente with the
Eastern Bloc nations.' The source of the coalition's most recent man-
date was the regular 1980 election, during which both parties had cam-
paigned on promises of continuing the partnership.
Less than halfway through its third four-year term of office, the
SPD/FDP coalition began to flounder. As in other Western European
nations and in the United States, the West German economy was suf-
fering from inflation, unemployment, and sluggish economic growth.7
The coalition partners found it increasingly difficult to agree upon the
appropriate remedial measures, and on February 3, 1982, Chancellor
Schmidt moved for a vote of confidence in the Bundestag in order to
secure his wavering majority. The February vote was in Schmidt's
favor, but tensions continued to mount throughout the spring and sum-
mer of 1982. On September 17, the four FDP ministers in Schmidt's
5. The 13 years of the social/liberal coalition are considered in detail in an eight-part
series in the weekly newspaper Die Zeit, beginning September 24, 1982 and ending Novem-
ber 12, 1982. See Dahrendorf, Das Baindnis der Selbsibewussten, Die Zeit, Sept. 24, 1982, at
4; Altmann, Vom Azufbruch zum Bruch, Die Zeit, Oct. 1, 1982, at 9; Baring, Die IVende karn
schon vor acht Jabren, Die Zeit, Oct. 8, 1982, at 4; Becker, lelnut Schrnifds assenpoitisches
Vermachtnis, Die Zeit, Oct. 15, 1982, at 3; Schwarz, In den Grenzzonen desgelobien Lander,
Die Zeit, Oct. 22, 1982, at 9; Bucerius, Sie meinten esja so gut, Die Zeit, Oct. 29, 1982, at 9;
L6wenthal, Draussen geachtet, in; Innern stabil, Die Zeit, Nov. 5, 1982, at 9; Donhofl, Vorher
undnachher, Die Zeit, Nov. 12, 1982, at 9.
6. The Constitutional Court took note of this fact in its opinion, 1983 EuGRZ at 58.
The SPD won 42.9% of the vote, and the FDP 10'6%. Id. Under article 39(1) of the Grund-
gesetz, the Bundestag is elected for a four-year period.
7. Real economic growth for 1982 was 1% less than in 1981. Inflation was approxi-
mately 5%. Unemployment was approximately 7.5%, affecting some 2.2 million workers.
See Jungblut, Abschied von einem Gotzen, Die Zeit, Oct. 29, 1982, at 17; Jungblut, Ein
Zandfunkeftr die Hoffnung, Die Zeit, Dec. 31, 1982, at 15, 22; DonhoffAm Ende doch ncht
gescheitert, Die Zeit, Sept. 24, 1982, at 1.
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cabinet resigned.'
Having lost the support of his coalition partners, Chancellor
Schmidt considered moving once again for a vote of confidence. Given
the fact that he had lost the support of the FDP and thus his majority
in the Bundestag, the vote was unlikely to be decided in Schmidt's
favor. Two alternatives for the reformation of the government came
into question at this point. Under article 68 of the Bonn Constitution,
Schmidt could petition the federal president to dissolve the Bundestag.
If, as expected, the president agreed to dissolve the Bundestag, elections
would follow immediately and another government would emerge
from the new political constellation in the parliament.9 This solution
presumed that the conservative opposition parties, the Christlich
Demokratische Union/Christlich Soziale Union (CDU/CSU),10 would
not join with the FDP in pursuing the second alternative available
under article 67 of the Bonn Constituion for forming a new govern-
ment. Under article 67 of the Bonn Constitution, a "constructive vote
of no-confidence" permits the opposition parties to register a vote of
no-confidence against a sitting chancellor on the condition that they
elect a new chancellor at the same time."
Chancellor Schmidt's proposal for immediate dissolution was
eventually rejected. Leaders of the CDU/CSU and FDP were able to
agree on an alternative candidate for the chancellorship and, on Octo-
ber 1, 1982, Hemut Kohl of the CDU was elected in the Bundestag as
the new chancellor under article 67 by a vote of 256 to 235, with four
deputies abstaining.' 2 Kohl's victory marked the first time that the
constructive vote of no-confidence had been used successfully to defeat
8. The opinion of the Constitutional Court, 1983 EuGRZ at 58-62, includes a detailed
account of the change of government and the events leading to dissolution from which this
description is taken. The vote of confidence provisions of the Bonn Constitution are dis-
cussed at notes 44-46, infra.
9. There was some question as to whether Schmidt's proposal was in accordance with
the constitution, as it interfered with the free use of the constructive vote of no-confidence in
article 67. Schmidt's proposal was rejected and therefore it is outside the scope of this Arti-
cle. See Eschenburg, Die Verfassung manivulieren?, Die Zeit, Sept. 24, 1982, at 8; Schenke,
Die verfassungswidrige Bundestagsaufl sung, 1982 NJW 2521, 2527.
10. The CSU is the Bavarian arm of the CDU.
11. Article 67(1) reads as follows: "The Bundestag can express its lack of confidence in
the Federal Chancellor only by electing a successor with the majority of its members and by
requesting the Federal President to dismiss the Federal Chancellor. The Federal President
must comply with the request and appoint the person elected." (This translation and all
subsequent ones from the Bonn Constitution are taken from PRESS & INFORMATION OFFICE
OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, TlE BASIC LAW OF TlE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (1974).)
12. 1983 EuGRZ at 58.
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a sitting chancellor, and the upset was widely referred to in the press as
the end of an era.
13
The new coalition promised changes in governmental policy 4 and
pledged that elections would be held in March 1983. The March 1983
election was negotiated as part of the agreement between the
CDU/CSU and FDP prior to the election of Helmut Kohl as chancel-
lor."5 It is not entirely clear what motivated the parties to promise new
elections, although, as shall be seen later in this Article, their rationale
was ultimately to be of key importance in resolving the constitutional
issues which arose in connection with the early dissolution. Some com-
mentators surmised that the new coalition postponed the election until
March so that the voters would forget their sympathies for the defeated
Helmut Schmidt. 6 It was, however, by no means certain that the
March election would be of particular advantage to its proponents. Re-
sults of elections to the state parliaments (Landage) in Hamburg and
Hessen in the fall of 1982, for example, had not given any political
party a decisive majority.'
7
A further source of political uncertainty in early 1983 was the be-ginning of a shift in the three party political structure (with two large
parties-CD U/CSU and SPD-and the small FDP) which had existed
since 1961. In the fall 1982 elections to the Landage of Hessen, Bay-
ern, and Hamburg, the FDP had lost its seats due to its inability to
capture five percent of the vote.' 8 A new party, the "Greens,"' 9 was
13. See, e-g., supra note 5.
14. Members of the new government announced plans to curb government spending for
social programs, and advocated a less conciliatory stance with respect to the Warsaw Pact
nations. Both coalition partners quickly agreed upon a series of emergency measures
designed to combat unemployment and check government spending, and to revise the 1983
budget which had been proposed by the SPD. See Das Programfr den IVechsel, Die Zeit,
Oct. 1, 1982, at 8.
15. 1983 EuGRZ at 58.
16. Fromme, Wenn einer sich das Vertrauen verneinen Iisst, Frankfurter Ailgemeine
Zeitung (FAZ), Sept. 29, 1982, at 12, coL 2.
17. See Bis espasst, DER SPIEGEL, Oct. 4, 1982, at 35; Gehinicht, DER SPIEGEL, OcL 11,
1982, at 142; Schwelien, Sic liebten undesi hasslen sich, Die Zeit, Dec. 3, 1982, at 33; Buhl,
Einer muss was zu sagen haben, Die Zeit, Dec. 10, 1982, at 3.
18. 1983 EuGRZ at 71-72. Parties receiving less than five percent of the vote are not
permitted to send deputies to the Bundestag according to the Bundeswahlgesetz (Federal
Election Law) of May 7, 1956. 1956 Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBI] I 383, § 6(4). This "five
percent clause" was drafted in order to curb the development of splinter parties, the prolifer-
ation of which had been partly responsible for the inability of the Weimar Republic govern-
ments to function. See infra text accompanying notes 35-53.
19. The "Green" party is a loosely knit, grassroots coalition of Germans whose general
aims are environmental protection, nuclear disarmament, and disengagement from the
NATO alliance.
1983]
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moving in as a potential new force on the political scene. The
"Greens" were able to overcome the five percent barrier in five
Landtage, including Hamburg and Hessen." Many observers of these
trends voiced concern that the new federal election would introduce
chaos into the Bundestag. In Hamburg and Hessen, the uncompromis-
ing position of the "Greens" against the stationing of United States
Pershing II and Cruise missiles in West Germany and the party's ex-
treme emphasis on environmental protection issues had made the coali-
tion process so difficult that a majority government could not be
formed in either of these Landage, and repeated elections were
needed." There was some apprehension that the same thing would
happen in the Bundestag, with the effect that the Federal Republic
would become "ungovernable."22
If the uncertainty of the political landscape motivated the new co-
alition to postpone elections until March, no politician admitted it
openly. Leaders of the new coalition explained instead that the eco-
nomic emergency necessitated immediate reform of the 1983 budget,
and that the formation of the coalition was merely a temporary solu-
tion. The chairman of the CDU/CSU caucus in the Bundestag, Dr.
Albert Dregger, explained during debate over the budget on December
14, 1982 that his party viewed the tasks of the coalition as limited to
passing emergency economic measures.2 3 He stated that the
CD U/CSU was not willing to work further with the FDP without new
elections. Said Dregger, "In order to overcome the economic and fi-
nancial crisis which we face, and in order to reach the weighty deci-
sions on foreign policy which lie before us, the new government needs
an entire legislative period. It is for this reason that we desire new
elections."' 24
A second motivation for the new election was doubtless a wide-
spread feeling that the new government lacked "legitimacy. '25 Despite
the fact that the liberal-democratic coalition had come into power com-
pletely in conformance with the Bonn Constitution, in some quarters
there was a sense that the FDP had betrayed the voters who had sup-
20. Hauch, 50 Kilometer vor Bonn, DER SPIEGEL, Oct. 4, 1982, at 134, 136.
21. See, e.g., Oertzen, Warum keinen rot-glne Koalition? DER SPIEGEL, Sept. 27, 1982,
at 35; Weder vor der 72r, DER SPIEGEL, Oct. 18, 1982, at 131.
22. See, e.g., Fack, Oeffnung zur Wahl, FAZ, Dec. 15, 1982, at 1; Reif3mtillerAm besten
unbeirrt welter, FAZ, Oct. 29, 1982, at 1.
23. 1983 EuGRZ at 59.
24. Id. (This and all subsequent translations of the court's decision are the author's.)
25. See, e.g., Augstein, Neuwahlen aus schlechtem Gewissen?, DER SPIEGEL, Oct. 11,
1982, at 18; Steiger, Legitmitit gegen Legalitiat?, Die Zeit, Dec. 3, 1982, at 5.
[Vol. 7
West German Parliament
ported it in 1980 assuming that it would enter into a coalition with the
SPD.26 Some members of the SPD described the new government as
"legar' but without "legitimacy."'27 Even Chancellor Kohl seemed to
be thinking along these lines in his remarks before the Bundestag on
December 17, 1982, when he stated that Germany's chances of recover-
ing from its most serious economic and financial crisis "turn upon
whether the work of the parties controlling the government is stpported
by a decisive mandate from the voters. The necessary political action
must be planned for the longterm. We do not want to bring about
piecemeal accomplishments; rather, we want to lay a permanent
foundation." 28
Despite complaints about the motivations of the new government,
the proposal of March elections was acceptable to all parties in the
Bundestag, even to the SPD, whose main complaint was that elections
had -not occurred earlier.29 A popular poll indicated that seventy-nine
percent of the voters also wanted an election. 0 Only one obstacle
stood in the way of the general consensus-in order to clear the way for
the March election, the Bundestag would have to be dissolved." There
was however, no provision in the Bonn Constitution clearly allowing
for dissolution when the federal chancellor was supported by a secure
majority in the Bundestag. The provision for a constructive vote of no-
confidence in article 67 only provides for the installation of the new
chancellor by a vote in the Bundestag, not for dissolution and subse-
quent referral of the change in government to the voters.32 Further-
more, it was not certain whether articles 63 and 68, the only two articles
providing for dissolution by the federal president, could be employed
by a majority chancellor to bring about new elections. Heated debate
arose as to whether and how the Bundestag could be legally dissolved.
33
In order to understand this debate and its ultimate resolution, it is nec-
essary to briefly examine German constitutional history.
B. Bonn is not Weimar
The early dissolution issue, arising nearly fifty years after Hitler's
26. Id.
27. See Zundel, Signale aus dem Fegefeuer, Die Zeit, Oct. 8, 1982, at 2 for a report of
the debate prior to the constructive vote of no-confidence, during which this issue arose.
28. 1983 EuGRZ at 60 (emphasis added).
29. See supra text accompanying note 9.
30. Stirbt die FDP, riberlebt Kohl?, DER SPIEGEL, Oct. 11, 1982, at 33, 38.
31. Grundgesetz [GG] art. 39 (1) (W. Ger.).
32. See supra note 11.
33. See infra notes 71-91 and accompanying text.
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fateful assumption of leadership of the Weimar Republic on January
30, 1933, struck a nerve among politicians and legal scholars.34 The
drafters of the 1949 Bonn Constitution had been mindful of the fact
that one of the reasons for Hitler's ability to gain control of Germany
in 1933 had been the inability of the numerous political parties at the
time to form a stable government under the 1919 Weimar Constitu-
tion.35 During the years between 1920 and 1932, the Weimar Republic
was led by twenty different governments, twelve of which were sup-
ported by only a minority in the parliament (Reichstag).36 All seven
Reichstage elected during this time were dissolved before the expira-
tion of the regular legislative session.37 Naturally, such governments
were incapable of solving the pressing problems of inflation and unem-
ployment suffered during these years. This circumstance made the
public receptive to the apparent solutions offered by the National So-
cialists.38 The drafters of the 1949 Bonn Constitution believed that the
instability of the Weimar Republic had been inherent in its constitu-
tional structure;39 the Bonn Constitution must be understood in part as
an effort to remedy the flaws perceived in the Weimar Constitution.40
The Weimar Constitution of 1919 was Germany's first real experi-
ence with a parliamentary system of government. Under the Constitu-
tion of 1871 (Reichsverfassung), the parliamentary organs had been
ineffectual as a democratic expression of the will of the populace. This
was because the Kaiser exercised autocratic control over the German
Federation. As president of the Federation, the Kaiser could call and
dismiss both legislative houses at will.4" The chancellor was named by
the Kaiser, and, until a change in the constitution on October 28, 1918,
the chancellor was not dependent upon the support of the parliament to
hold office.42
The Weimar Constitution attempted to blend the so-called "presi-
34. See Schneider, Neuwahlen-Ausweg oder Irrweg?, DER SPIEGEL, Sept. 27, 1983, at
27.
35. Maurer, Vorzeihige Auflasung des Bundestags, 1982 D6V 1001, 1002.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. For a detailed historical study of the dissolution of the Weimar Republic, see K.D,
BRACHER, DIE AUFL6SUNG DER WEIMARER REPUBLIK (6th ed. 1978).
39. See von Mangoldt, Die Auflosung des Bundestags, 1950 D6V 697, 698-99. Von
Mangoldt was a member of the Parliamentary Council that drafted the Grundgesetz.
40. Id.
41. REICHSVERFASSUNG of 1871, 1871 Reichsgesetzblatt [RGBI] 64, arts. I143. The
parliament was dissolved by the Council of the Federation (Bundesral) at the agreement of
the Kaiser -under article 24.
42. Id.; art. 15, amended by the Law of Oct. 28, 1918, 1918 RGB1 1274.
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dential" elements of the 1871 Constitution (Reichsverfassung) with
characteristics of parliamentary cabinet government.43 The new presi-
dent of the Reich, like the Kaiser, was to have a strong role in the gov-
ernment. The president retained the Kaiser's power to appoint and
dismiss the chancellor and government ministers.44 Unlike the Kaiser,
however, the president was directly elected by the people 45 Under the
Weimar Constitution, the president's power was balanced against that
of the parliament (Reichstag), another organ directly elected by the
people. The parliament had the power to dismiss the chancellor or
ministers through a vote of no-confidence. 46 If the parliament and
president disagreed on an issue (or if a chancellor appointed by the
president disagreed with the parliament), the president had the power
to dissolve the parliament and appeal to the people as the ultimate ar-
bitrators of the dispute. A provision in the Weimar Constitution
prohibiting dissolution more than once each year over the same dis-
puted issue ensured that the wishes of the people would be carried
out.4 7 The parliament had its own weapon against the president in the
case of disagreement. Under article 43 of the Weimar Constitution, the
parliament could appeal to the voters to recall the president. If the
voters failed to do so, the president was treated as having been newly
elected and the parliament was dissolved. The Weimar Constitution
also had provisions for submitting legislation to referendum on the mo-
tion of the president or the parliament.4"
After World War II, the drafters of the Bonn Constitution at-
tempted to build more stability into the Federal Republic's new system
of government. One way was to remove the elements of direct democ-
racy that were the perceived causes of fragmentation and instability
during the Weimar Republic.49 Under the new Bonn Constitution, the
Federal Republic would become a "representative democracy.' sO This
scheme established the federal parliament (Bundestag) as the only gov-
emnmental organ directly elected by the citizens. The Bundestag was
43. Maurer, supra note 35, at 1002.
44. REICHSVERFASSUNG Of 1919, 1919 RGB1 1383, art. 53.
45. Id. art. 41.
46. Id. art. 54.
47. 1d. art. 25.
48. Id. art 73.
49. See Schlussbericht der Enqu~te-Kommirsion Verfaxsungsreform, Deutscher
Bundestag, 7. Wahlperiode, DRUCKSACHE 7/5924, Dec. 9, 1976, at 9-14, 22-23 [hereinafter
cited as Enquite Report]; For information on the Enquire Commission, see infra text accom-
panying note 70.
50. Id.; Maurer, supra note 26, at 1002-03.
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given the responsibility for electing the federal chancellor and for elect-
ing and dismissing the federal president."' The situations in which is-
sues could be submitted directly to the public in a referendum were
drastically limited.52 It was hoped that by decreasing the direct impact
of fragmented special interest groups on the political process, the pit-
falls of the Weimar Republic could be avoided. By entrusting the gov-
ernment to representatives responsible to the nation as a whole rather
than to individual groups of voters, the drafters of the Bonn Constitu-
tion meant to avoid the situation where disagreement among small
political parties prevented the formation of workable governing
coalitions.
5 3
The core of West Germany's new "representative democracy" is
found in article 38 of the Bonn Constitution, which provides that
"[T]he deputies to the German Bundestag shall be elected by general,
direct, free, equal and secret elections. They shall be representatives of
the whole people, not bound by orders and instructions, and shall be
subject only to their conscience.' 54 The purpose of this provision was
to free the deputies to the Bundestag from obligation to any particular
interest group that could prevent the formation and functioning of an
integrated governmental program. Rather than being legally bound to
constituents by an "imperative mandate," a West German deputy's
representative function is to use his or her mandate to represent the
nation as a whole.
55
A second strategy for stability in Bonn involved changing the bal-
ance of power between the president, chancellor and Bundes/ag. The
role of the president was weakened by making the office a neutral and
51. [GG] arts. 54, 63, 64 (W. Ger.).
52. Id. art. 29. This article provides for popular initiatives with regard to the reorgani-
zation of federal territory after World War II.
53. Enqute Report, supra note 49, at 9-14, 22-23.
54. See id. at 24.
55. See INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION, PARLIAMENTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY ON
THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONING OF REPRESENTATIVE INSTITUTIONS IN FIFTY FIvn
COUNTRIES 52 (2d ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited as PARLIAMENTS]. The freedom of the deputy
to the Bundestag is in practice somewhat restricted due to the discipline imposed by the
party caucuses (Fraktionen) in the Bundestag. Although the deputy is legally free to vote as
his or her conscience dictates, he or she is not free from party sanctions (such as expulsion)
should he or she fail to support the party's program. One commentator has reasoned that
party discipline does not neutralize the freedom guaranteed in article 38 because the deputy
can work within the Fraktion to influence its vote as a body; the unified vote that emerges
from the Fraktionen is in reality a consensus of its members, reached internally,
Friesenhahn, Parteien und Parlamentarismus nach dem Grundgesetz/flr die Bundesrepublik




nonpolitical subordinate to the Bundestag and chancellor. Unlike the
president's counterpart in the Weimar Republic, the federal president
is elected by the Bundestag rather than by the public. The president is
obligated to appoint the chancellor elected by the Bundestag and to
dismiss a chancellor dismissed by the Bundestag. As a neutral officer,
the president may not hold any other government position and plays
only a limited role in governmental decisions. 6
At the same time, the Bonn Constitution strengthened the position
of the federal chancellor by making it more difficult for the Bundestag
to unseat the chancellor. Article 67 of the Bonn Constitution permits a
vote of no-confidence against the government only when the parties in
opposition are able to elect a new chancellor at the same time. This
article was specifically designed to prevent the situation which had re-
peatedly occurred in the Weimar Republic, in which the parties in op-
position had been able to topple the government even though they
could not form a majority to proceed with further state business.-7
Finally, the Bonn Constitution imposed stringent restrictions on
early dissolution of the Bundestag. The federal president's power to
dissolve the Bundestag is subject to the limitations imposed by two
articles:
Article 63 (Election of the Federal Chancellor-Dissolution of the
Bundestag)
(1) The federal chancellor shall be elected, without debate, by the
Bundestag upon the proposal of the federal president.
(2) The person obtaining the votes of the majority of the members
of the Bundestag shall be elected. The person elected must be ap-
pointed by the federal president.
(3) If the person proposed is not elected, the Bundestag may elect
within fourteen days of the ballot a federal chancellor by more than
one-half of its members.
(4) If no candidate has been elected within this period, a new ballot
shall take place without delay, in which the person obtaining the
largest number of votes shall be elected. If the person elected has
obtained the votes of the majority of the members of the Bundestag,
the federal president must appoint him within seven days of the elec-
tion. If the person elected did not obtain such a majority, the federal
president must within seven days either appoint him or dissolve the
Bundestag.
56. GG arts. 54, 63(2), 67, 55. See Schenke, supra note 9. at 2524; von Mangoldt, Supra
note 39, at 699.
57. Article 67 is quoted in note 11, supra. For a discussion of the legislative history of
this article with extensive citations, see 1983 EuGRZ at 80-85 (Rinck, J., separate opinion).
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Article 68 (Vote of Confidence-Dissolution of the Bundestag)
(1) If a motion of the federal chancellor for a vote of confidence is
not assented to by the majority of the members of the Bundestag, the
federal president may, upon the proposal of the federal chancellor,
dissolve the Bundestag within twenty-one days. The right to dissolve
shall lapse as soon as the Bundestag with the majority of its members
elects another federal chancellor.
(2) Forty-eight hours must elapse between the motion and the vote
thereon.
By encouraging or forcing repeated efforts to build a majority in
the Bundestag, articles 63 and 68 seek to make it as difficult as possible
for the political parties to avoid their duty to work together to find
political solutions to the nation's problems. The provisions for dissolu-
tion in these articles operate as a threat to uncooperative political par-
ties, coercing them to form an effective parliamentary majority or face
the possible loss of seats following an election campaign.58
It is important to note that under both articles 63 and 68, dissolu-
tion is not the required resolution of the situation where the chancellor
has lost the support of the majority of deputies in the Bundestag. In
article 63, the president's discretion to dissolve the Bundes/ag comes
into play only after repeated attempts to elect a chancellor have failed.
Even in a case where the president may exercise discretion to dissolve
the Bundestag, the president has the option to name a minority chan-
cellor if it appears that this would be the wiser political choice. Article
68 requires the cooperation of the Bundestag, chancellor and president
before the dissolution of the Bundestag is allowed and provides escape
routes from the dissolution procedure at various stages.5 9 A further
indication that dissolution is not mandatory is found in article 81,
which provides for emergency legislative measures to assist a minority
government in carrying out state business in case the president decides
not to dissolve the Bundestag under article 68.60
58. PARLIAMENTS, supra note 55, at 287-88.
59. See the Constitutional Court's analysis at notes 136-40 infra.
60. GG art. 81(l)-(2) reads as follows:
(1) Should, in the circumstances of Article 68, the Bundestag not be dissolved, the
Federal President may, at the request of the Federal Government and with the
consent of the Bundesrat, declare a state of legislative emergency with respect to a
bill, if the Bundestag rejects the bill although the Federal Government has declared
it to be urgent. The same shall apply if a bill has been rejected although the Fed-
eral Chancellor had combined with it the motion under Article 68.
(2) If, after a state 6f legislative emergency has been declared, the Bundestag
again rejects the bill or adopts it in a version stated to be unacceptable to the Fed.
eral Government, the bill shall be deemed to have become a law to the extent that
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Articles 63 and 68 make early dissolution of the legislative body
more difficult in West Germany than in most of its Western European
neighbors. The constitutions of France (Fifth Republic, article 12),
Belgium (article 71), the Netherlands (article 82), Austria (article 29),
Italy (article 88), Ireland (article 13), Denmark (article 32), Portugal
(article 81), Sweden (article 108), and Finland (article 27) all permit the
head of state to dissolve the parliament before the end of the legislative
session without meeting any particular legal or political prerequisites."
This unrestricted practice is also followed in Great Britain.62 In these
countries, early dissolution may serve as a means of referring contro-
versial issues to the voters, of legitimizing a legislative body that no
longer appears to represent the will of the people, or of resolving a
dispute between the parliament and government. Early dissolution
may also be used by the government to bring about elections at a time
advantageous to it or to maintain discipline among the majority party
members.63 Bringing an early end to the legislative session is not nec-
essarily an extraordinary emergency measure in these nations; rather, it
is a tool to be used at the discretion of the head of state to meet certain
political needs of the state.
In West Germany, however, the restrictions on early dissolution
evidence the intent of the Bonn Constitution's drafters that once the
government has been entrusted to members of the Bundestag for the
four-year period prescribed in article 39, further appeal to the voters
should be permitted only in extreme situations. This restriction can be
seen as a direct reaction to the German experience during the Weimar
Republic.'
Prior to December 1982, the issue of early dissolution had arisen
in practice in three instances, all concerning the use of article 68. In
1950, there was an unsuccessful effort by the opposition SPD to force
Chancellor Konrad Adenauer (CDU) to use article 68 to dissolve the
Bundestag so that the issues of rearmament and integration with the
West could be submitted to the voters.65 In 1966 the SPD again at-
the Bundesrat consents to it. The same shall apply if the bill is not passed by the
Bundestag within four weeks of its reintroduction....
61. Wolf & von Welck, Die Aluflsung der Volk.sertretung in parlamentarschen
Demokratien in PARLAMENTSAUFL6SUNG: PRAXIS-THEoRiE--AUSBLICK 131-40 (K.
Kremer ed. 1974).
62. Id. at 132.
63. Id. at 131-40; K. VON BEYME, DIE PARLAMENTARISCHEN REGIERUNOSSYSTEME IN
EUROPA 853 (1970); PARLiAMENTS, supra note 55, at 285-88.
64. See supra text accompanying notes 43-57.
65. See von Mangoldt, supra note 39.
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tempted unsuccessfully to persuade Chancellor Erhard (CDU) to dis-
solve the Bundestag by means of the vote of confidence after the FDP
left his governing coalition but refused to join with the SPD to elect a
new chancellor under the constructive vote of no-confidence.6 6 It was
not until 1972 that the first premature dissolution of the Bundestag took
place. In that year, the opposition CDU had enough votes to block the
passage of the government's proposed budget by a vote of 247 to 247.67
This number of votes did not, however, give the opposition the requi-
site majority to replace Chancellor Willy Brandt (SPD) by a construc-
tive vote of no-confidence under article 67. The situation was a
stalemate; the government could not pass its budget, and the opposition
could not unseat the government. Chancellor Brandt resolved the situ-
ation by moving for a vote of confidence under article 68, with the
intent that it be decided against him. A vote of no-confidence enabled
Brandt to request dissolution of the Bundestag, opening the way for
new elections which ultimately gave the SPD a secure majority.68
Brandt's use of article 68 to deliberately bring about dissolution rather
than to consolidate a majority was generally considered to be within
constitutional bounds, but it did not escape criticism.6 9 The 1972 stale-
mate prompted the formation of a legislative commission (Enquire-
Kommission) to study possible amendments to the Bonn Constitution.
In its final report in 1976, the Commission recommended, among other
things, a change in the Bonn Constitution to allow the Bundeslag to
dissolve itself.70 This proposal received no debate in the Bundestag,
which ultimately failed to act upon it. The issue of self-dissolution
gained no further public attention until the advent of the present
controversy.
C. The Legal Controversy
The 1982 debate on how best to dissolve the Bundestag centered
on three alternatives. Procedurally, the Bonn Constitution contained
two potential means for Chancellor Kohl to bring about dissolution
and new elections. He could either resign, thus activating the proce-
66. K. VON BEYME, supra note 63, at 659.
67. 1983 EuGRZ at 79 (Rinck, J., separate opinion).
68. For a short summary of the 1972 situation see id. For a detailed analysis see Lange
and Richter, Erste Vorzeitge Auflbsung des Bundestags, 1973 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR PARLA-
MENTSFRAGEN [ZPARL] 38.
69. See, e.g., Bull, Parlamentsaufpsung-Zurckverweisung an den Souveran, 5 ZtIrT-
SCHRIFT FOR RECHTSPOLITIK [ZRP] 201-04 (1972); Schneider, Die vereinbarte Parlamcnts-
auflbsung, 1973 JZ 652.
70. Enquite Report, supra note 49, at 32-48.
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dures in article 63, or he could pose a motion for a vote of confidence
under article 68 and ask members of his party to withhold their sup-
port. Given the hurdles which the Bonn Constitution places in the way
of dissolution, it was highly uncertain whether either of these proce-
dures was permissible where the chancellor had, as did the Kohl gov-
ernment, the support of the majority of deputies. As noted above,7" the
purpose of these articles was to bring about an effective majority in the
Bundestag rather than to permit new elections. Should dissolution
under articles 63 and 68 prove to be illegal, the only alternative avail-
able would be a constitutional amendment providing for easier dissolu-
tion of the Bundestag.
All three possibilities were discussed extensively during the wide-
spread public debate which developed between the October I election
of Chancellor Kohl and the eventual dissolution of the Bundestag on
January 7, 1983.72 In general, this debate pitted legal scholars against
politicians.73 Most academicians felt that a request for dissolution by a
chancellor with a majority in the Bundestag was an unconstitutional
manipulation of articles 63 and 68.74 The politicians believed that the
election had become a practical necessity. While the change in govern-
ment may have been constitutionally permissible under article 67, the
FDP had campaigned in 1980 on the promise of maintaining its gov-
erning coalition with the Social Democrats. Some thus felt that the
FDP had abused its mandate. Also, the new government had commit-
ted itself to March elections, and both parties were already incurring
expenses in anticipation of the campaign. Some politicians believed
that declaring the promised elections a nullity would not make a good
public impression75 and would be a waste of campaign preparations
already undertaken.
The idea of a constitutional amendment allowing for self-dissolu-
tion of the Bundestag was seen by many critics as the "cleanest" solu-
71. See supra text accompanying note 58.
72. A complete survey of the coverage of this issue in the German press would be a
study in itself. See notes 5, 14-17, 21-34, supra for examples of the press coverage.
73. Fromme, Politiker und rofessoren streften fiber die Bundesragsauftsung, FAZ, Dec.
11, 1982, at 6.
74. 1983 EuGRZ at 85-86 (separate opinion of Justice Rinck). See also Maurer, rupra
note 35; Schenke, supra note 9; Schroder, PariamenIsauj7ftsung bei gericherten Mehrhels-
verhaltissen?, 1982 JZ 786; Schenke, Zur vefassungsrechtlichen Problematik der Bundertags-
aujlsung, 1983 NJW 150; Enqu&e Report, supra note 49, at 39. Those arguing that the early
dissolution was within the limits of the Grundgeset: included P(lttner, Vor:eitige
Neuwahlen--Ein ungelostes Reformproblem, 1983 NJW 15; Liesegang, Zur veTrasungxrechi-
lichen Problematik der Bundestagsaufsung, 1983 NJW 147.
75. See Schenke, supra note 74, 1983 NJW at 150.
1983]
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
tion because it would not require stretching the meaning of articles 63
or 68. The use of these articles to disrupt rather than to consolidate a
majority appeared to these critics to be a manipulation of the constitu-
tion at the expense of the legislative purpose. The fact that the Enquire
Kommission had carefully considered and recommended a self-dissolu-
tion amendment in 1976 undermined the counter argument that a con-
stitutional change arising from the current situation would be just as
manipulative as the use of the existing constitutional provisions. 76
On the other hand, an amendment to the Bonn Constitution would
give rise to other constitutional counter arguments, and such an
amendment seemed politically unwise under the circumstances.
Amendment of the Constitution in the midst of the controversy would
arguably be an infringement of article 79, which states that the consti-
tution may only be changed by a law passed by two-thirds of the mem-
bers in both legislative chambers (Bundestag and Bundesral). Although
occasion for amending the constitution may arise out of a particular
fact situation, the change itself must be an abstract norm good for all
future cases, and not merely tailored for a specific situation." Despite
the possibility of drafting a constitutional amendment to meet these
requirements (the Enqu&e Kommission had in fact drafted such an
amendment), doubt was expressed that the change could be made for
the current legislative period.71 In any case, it seemed ill-considered to
rush such an amendment through the legislature under the heated
political conditions which existed. The new government was already
concerned with its legitimacy; it did not seem wise to amend the consti-
tution so soon after taking office. For these reasons, the idea of a con-
stitutional amendment was not the route selected by the new coalition
for early dissolution.
Willy Brandt and the SPD advocated the resignation of the chan-
cellor and his ministers as the best path to new elections. 79 The resig-
nation would set the provisions of article 63 into action, which required
several unsuccessful ballots in the Bundestag before it could be dis-
solved by the federal president. This procedure was seen by its advo-
cates as more "honest" since the chancellor would not be put into the
position of asking his supporters to vote against him. Resignation
would be an honest expression of his desire not to head the government
any longer.
76. See, e.g., Schenke, supra note 9, at 2528.
77. Maurer, supra note 35, at 1006-07.
78. Id. at 1007.
79. Brandt: Kohl soll Yon Artikel 63 Gebrauch machen, FAZ, Dec. 9, 1982, at 4.
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Opponents to proceeding under article 63, however, were dis-
turbed by the thought that members of the Bundestag would be put into
the "dishonest" position of repeatedly refusing to elect a new chancel-
lor when they had, by a majority, supported the one who had just re-
signed."0 Article 63 had a further disadvantage in that it took control of
the dissolution proceedings away from the chancellor and put it into
the hands of the deputies and the president. A chancellor losing the
vote of confidence under article 68 has the option of requesting dissolu-
tion or continuing to govern as a minority chancellor. Once the chan-
cellor resigns under article 63, however, the election of the new
chancellor is in the hands of the Bundestag, and the president can
choose to appoint a minority government without consulting the for-
mer chancellor.8" The new coalition eventually rejected the resignation
of Chancellor Kohl as a means to bring about new elections. In his
televised announcement of dissolution on January 7, 1983, President
Carstens explained that the need for repeated balloting under article 63
made the procedure too uncertain and complex as a path to elections.82
From the outset of the discussion, article 68 seemed to be the most
likely procedure to bring about new elections, and it was eventually the
mechanism chosen by Chancellor Kohl. Some proponents of this alter-
native argued that article 68's meaning had been expanded by political
practice over the years to encompass situations not foreseen at the time
the Bonn Constitution was drafted. Critics questioned whether it
would be possible to test the motives of the deputies and chancellor for
conformance with the constitution. 3 Other supporters of the use of
article 68 saw instability in the government similar to that which had
existed in 1972, evidenced by the fact that the coalition had been ex-
pressly formed for the limited time necessary to take emergency eco-
nomic measures. These commentators noted that article 68 had been
used in 1972 to dissolve the Bundestag under the Brandt government,
and that this proceeding had been constitutionally acceptable."
Opponents of dissolution under article 68 distinguished the situa-
tion of the Brandt government in 1972 from that of Chancellor Kohl in
1982. They pointed out that, unlike the Brandt government, the Kohl
80. Maurer, supra note 35, at 1005; Schenke, supra note 9, at 2526.
81. Bull, supra note 69, at 201.
82. The text of this speech is printed at Carstens: 1ch habe nmir die Sache nicht /echt
gemacht, FAZ, Jan. 8, 1983, at 2; see also 1983 EuGRZ at 61-62.
83. See, ag., Ptittner, supra note 74, at 15-16; Liesegang, supra note 57, at 148-49.
84. This reasoning was followed by the Constitutional Court, 1983 EuGRZ at 70, 73.
See Zeh, Aundestagsamftusung und.Aeuwahlen, 1983 DaR STAAT 1, 14-15.
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government was able to pass its 1983 budget in the Bundestag. On
December 16, 1982, the day before the balloting on the vote of confi-
dence, Kohl's 1983 budget was passed by a vote of 266 to 206.85 The
fact that the coalition partners had only agreed to limited cooperation
was no evidence of instability to these commentators, who maintained
that such agreements were not foreseen in the Bonn Constitution and
were therefore of questionable legality.8 6 In addition, those opposing
the use of article 68 believed that the legislative history of the provision
militated against a motion for a vote of confidence by a chancellor with
a majority in the Bundestag. They argued that the drafters intended to
make dissolution difficult in order to avoid the parliamentary instabil-
ity which had plagued the Weimar Republic. Kohl's proposal seemed
to fly in the face of the drafters' purpose.8 7 Moreover, the interrelation-
ship of article 68 with other relevant constitutional provisions was ad-
vanced as an argument against its invocation. The structure embodied
in articles 67, 63, 68, 39, and 81 manifested the intent to insure that a
functioning majority carries on the government's business for the full
legislative session. 8
Further structural evidence against article 68 dissolution was seen
in the limited role of the federal president. By expanding the range of
possible situations in which the president was permitted to exercise dis-
cretion to dissolve the Bundestag, greater political importance would be
given to the office than had originally been intended by the Bonn Con-
stitution. 9 Finally, those concerned with the structure of the Bonn
Constitution noted that allowing more frequent dissolution would add
undesirable elements of direct democracy by permitting a chancellor
faced with a thorny political problem to refer the matter to the voters.
Proponents of this point of view argued that the Federal Republic's
democracy rested on the principles of "representative democracy,"
under which direct public participation was limited in order to insure
the smooth functioning of the government.90 In sum, opponents of dis-
solution under article 68 felt that the purpose of this provision, as evi-
denced by its historical background and the overall structure of the
Bonn Constitution, was to permit dissolution of the Bundestag only as a
last resort in two situations: 1) when the chancellor wishes to
85. Maurer, supra note 35, at 1005. The figures can be found in 1983 EuGRZ at 59.
86. Schenke, supra note 74, 1983 NJW at 152.
87. Schenke, supra note 9, at 2523.
88. Id. at 2-523-24.
89. Id. at 2524.
90. Maurer, supra note 35, at 1005-06.
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strengthen his position by consolidating his majority, as Chancellor
Schmidt had intended when he asked for a vote of confidence in Febru-
ary 1982, or 2) when tensions between the Bundestag and chancellor
have become so extreme that a majority government can no longer
function, as was the case when Chancellor Brandt moved for a vote of
confidence in 1972.91
On December 13, 1982, Chancellor Kohl announced that he would
pose the motion for a vote of confidence under article 68. On Decem-
ber 17, after a nationally televised heated debate in the Bundestag,
Kohl lost the vote of confidence by a margin of 213 to 8, with 248
members of the CD U/CSU and FDP abstaining.92 On the same day,
Chancellor Kohl asked President Carstens to dissolve the Btndestag.
President Carstens announced that he would comply with Kohl's
wishes on January 7, 1983, and elections were scheduled for March 6,
1983. 93
With the President's announcement, the political decision for the
new election had been made. On January 17, 1983, four deputies (one
from the CDU, two from theFDP, and one former SPD member) peti-
tioned the Federal Constitutional Court to review the legality of the
President's actions. The court agreed that it had jurisdiction over the
complaint, and on February 16, 1983, declared that the President's ac-
tions had been in accordance with the Bonn Constitution.94
For observers in the United States, the procedural aspects of the
decision are just as interesting as its substance. The Constitutional
Court undertook to review what would be deemed a "political ques-
tion" in United States jurisprudence, and in doing so, displayed a
breadth in the scope of its review powers unknown to most of the com-
parable courts in the world. Therefore, before entering into a detailed
substantive explanation of the court's judgment on the merits, a short
comparative digression will explain the unusual character of the Con-
stitutional Court's exercise of jurisdiction in this case.
II. THE LEGAL RESOLUTION
A. The Constitutional Court's Power to Review
The Federal Republic's Constitutional Court differs from the
91. Schrder, supra note 74, is particularly concerned with the use of article 68 as a
crisis managing device.
92. 1983 EuGRZ at 61.
93. See supra note 82.
94. 1983 EuGRZ at 66.
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United States Supreme Court in two essential aspects, both of which
are illustrated by the controversy under discussion. The first difference
is that in the Federal Republic, the power to review the constitutional-
ity of the acts of the other two branches of government is centralized in
the Federal Constitutional Court, which is an independent organ
standing outside of the other courts in the judicial system.95 The sec-
ond difference is that the scope of the Constitutional Court's subject
matter jurisdiction is much broader than is that of the United States
Supreme Court.96 With regard to its institutional characteristics, the
Federal Constitutional Court, under its constitution of 1978, is more
similar to the constitutional courts of Austria, Italy, and Spain than it is
to the United States Supreme Court.9 7 With regard to the scope of its
jurisdiction, the far-reaching competence of the West German court
distinguishes it from its European counterparts as well as from the
United States Supreme Court.
Except under limited circumstances, the United States Supreme
Court is a court of appellate jurisdiction.9" It shares the power to re-
view the constitutionality of acts of the other branches of government
with the other courts in the judicial system, and it sits at the top of the
judicial system as a tribunal of last resort.99 Constitutional issues reach
it as part of a matrix of other issues involved in a particular case; thus
the United States Supreme Court may find itself deciding questions of
both constitutional and nonconstitutional import within the same pro-
ceeding. In contrast, the constitutional courts of West Germany, Italy,
Austria, and Spain are not appellate courts in this sense. In these Euro-
pean nations, the power of constitutional review is centralized in a sin-
gle constitutional court which stands apart from the other courts in the
judicial system."°
In the Federal Republic, the Constitutional Court is a "federal
court independent of and separate from all the other constitutional or-
gans."' 0 1 These "constitutional organs" include the five specialized hi-
95. Rupp, The Federal Constitutional Court in Germany--Scope of Its Jurisdiction and
Procedure, 44 NOTRE DAME LAW. 548 (1969).
96. Id. at 548-49.
97. Id.
98. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
99. M. CAPPELLETTI, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD, 46-47 (1971)
refers to the United States system of constitutional review as a "decentralized" or "diffuse"
system.
100. Id.; R. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW: CASES, TEXT AND MATERIALS 358-59
(4th ed. 1980).
101. Gesetz iber das Bundesverfassungsgericht (Law of the Federal Constitutional
Court) of March 12, 1951, 1951 BGBI 1243, § 1(1) (Author's translation).
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erarchies of the judicial system, which consist of the courts of ordinary,
labor, social security, tax, and administrative jurisdiction. Each of the
five hierarchies is three-tiered, with courts of first instance, intermedi-
ate appellate courts, and courts of last resort. 0 2 While these special-
ized courts are empowered to consider the constitutionality of the
statutes which apply in the cases that come before them, they are not
competent to declare any statute unconstitutional. If a specialized
court believes that a statute relevant to its decision is unconstitutional,
it must refer the constitutional issue (but not the whole case) to the
Federal Constitutional Court for determination before proceeding any
further. The Constitutional Court resolves the constitutional issue only
and returns the record to the referring court, which applies the decision
to the case.
10 3
The issue of constitutionality may be raised by the specialized
court itself or by an individual who feels that his or her constitutional
rights have been infringed by the government. The former type of pro-
cedure is referred to as a konkrete Normenkontrolle (judicial referral);
the latter avenue is called a Verfassungsbeschwerde (constitutional com-
plaint). °4 Procedures similar to the konkrete Normenkontrolle exist in
Spain, Italy and Austria; the Vetfassungsbeschwerde is found only in
Spain and Austria. 10 5
The Federal Constitutional Court has competence to speak in
other situations where the United States Supreme Court must remain
silent. The German court can, for example, render an "advisory opin-
ion" as to the constitutionality of a statute at the request of the govern-
102. The courts of last resort are federal courts; the first two instances are Land courts.
See R. SCHLESINGER, supra note 100; Meador, Appellate Subject Matter Organization: The
German Design From an American Perspective, 5 HASTINGS INT'L & Cosip. L Rnv. 27
(1982).
103. R. SCHLESINGER, supra note 100.
104. Rupp, The Federal Constitutional Court and the Constitution of the Federal Republic
of Germany, 16 ST. Louts U.L.J. 359, 360-63 (1972); GG art. 93(l)(4a) (1949, amended
1968), 100(l). The English terminology is from R. SCHLESINGER, supra note 100.
105. The jurisdiction of the Spanish Constitutional Court under the 1978 constitution is
described by Faller, Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in Spanien, 1979 EuGRZ 237; Faller, Das
Spanische Veq'assungsgericht, 29 JAHRBUCH DES OFF.NTLICHEN RECHTS DER GEGENWART
279 (1980). For a discussion of the jurisdiction of the Italian Court, see Sandulli, Die Veqax.
sungsgerichtsbarkeit in Italien, in VERFASSUNGSGERICHTSBARKEIT IN DER GEGENWART 292,
302-03 (H. Mosler ed. 1962). Austria's Constitutional Court is discussed in Melchiar, Die
Vegfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in vOsterreich, in id. at 439, 458-60, 469. The Verfassung-
sbeschwerde may be used in Austria only to protest administrative acts by the executive
branch of government. See also Alexy, Verfassungsbeschwerde, in id. at 740; Bernhardt,
Normenkontrolle, in id. at 727.
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ment or of one third of the members of the Bundestag."16 Procedures
corresponding to this "abstrakte Normenkontrolle" exist in Spain, Italy,
and Austria."0 7 Of particular importance to this study is the power of
the West German court to settle constitutional disputes between the
other organs of the federal government in a proceeding known as an
Organstreit. The Organstreit is established in article 93(l)(1) of the
Bonn Constitution:
(1) The Federal Constitutional Court shall decide: 1. on the inter-
pretation of this Basic Law in the event of disputes concerning the
extent of the rights and duties of a highest federal organ or of other
parties concerned who have been vested with rights of their own by
this Basic Law or by rules of procedure of a highest federal
organ . .. '08
Article 93 empowers the Constitutional Court to resolve disputes
between the federal executive and legislative branches concerning their
respective powers under the Bonn Constitution. The object of the Or-
ganstreit must be a disputed interpretation of the written or unwritten
principles of the constitution.10 9 The controversy must arise from the
concrete exercise of rights or duties under the constitution; the Court
will not settle abstract disagreements between the other branches of
government.110 Therefore, there must be a showing that, by virtue of
an act or omission of the respondent organ, the complainant organ suf-
fered injury or threat of injury to a constitutionally guaranteed right.
The respondent organ's act or omission must have occurred in the con-
text of its constitutionally prescribed functions. In short, the conflict
must have arisen out of a legal relationship between the parties based
on the constitution and with mutual rights and duties on each side.
Those having standing to sue or be sued include the federal president,
the Bundestag, the federal government, and members of these organs
who have individual rights guaranteed to them as members of the or-
gans. An individual deputy to the Bundestag thus has standing to sue
as a party in an Organstreit with regard to injuries to his or her consti-
tutional status as a deputy."'
It is important to note that the decisions of the Constitutional
106. Rupp, supra note 95, at 553; GG art. 93(l)-(2).
107. See Failer, spra note 105, 29 JAHRBUCH DES (FFENTLICHEN REcTS DIEt
GEGENWART at 283; Sandulli, supra note 105, at 302; Melchiar, supra note 105, at 457.
108. T. MAUNZ, B. SCHMIDT-BLEIBTREU, F. KLEIN, & G. ULSAMER, BUNDESVERFAS-
SUNGSGERICHTSGESETZ § 3, para. 39 (1979) [hereinafter cited as T. MAUNZ].
109. Id.
l10. Id.
11. Id. § 63, paras. 9, 10.
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Court in an Organstreit are only declaratory. This is to prevent the
court from entering too deeply into political controversies. 1 2 Article 93
states that the decision of the Court is an interpretation arising out of a
dispute between governmental organs. The decision thus merely de-
clares whether a violation of the constitution has occurred, without ad-
dressing the concrete legal consequences of its interpretation.' " 3 In an
early case in which the court considered whether the Petersberg Agree-
ment between the Federal Republic and the Allied High Commission
should have been submitted to the Bundestag for confirmation, the
Constitutional Court refused to decide whether or not the Agreement
was void.' The court only addressed the issue of conformance with
the constitution.
The Organstreit enables the Federal Constitutional Court to pass
judgment on issues which the United States Supreme Court would dis-
miss as "political questions.""I5 A former associate justice of the Con-
stitutional Court has remarked that the existence of the Organstreit in
the United States at the time of the Steel Seizure Case 6 would have
permitted the United States Congress to initiate proceedings against
President Truman to have the Supreme Court decide whether the presi-
dent's executive order seizing the steel industry encroached on legisla-
tive power. 7 Likewise, in Myers v. United States,"8 the Organstreit
would have been the jurisdictional basis for an action by the United
States Senate against the president for a Supreme Court ruling that the
president had illegally dismissed an appointed government official
without prior senate approval."t 9
The Organstreit has been characterized as "the most sensitive spot
in the whole structure of the [Constitutional] Court's jurisdiction."'
' 20
112. Id. § 67, para. 4; LOcke, Die statgebende Entscheidung im verfassungsgerichtlichen
Organstreitverfahren und ihre Konsequenzen, 1983 JZ 380.
113. T. MAu1Z, supra note 108, at § 67, para. 4. The duty of a governmental organ to
take action to correct the constitutional violation after the court has spoken is an area of
great uncertainty. One critic has stated that a duty to correct the illegal behavior when this
is possible arises out of article 20(3) of the Bonn Constitution: "Legislation shall be subject
to the constitutional order, the executive and the judiciary shall be bound by law and jus-
tice." LOcke, supra note 112, at 381.
114. Judgment of July 29, 1952, 1 BVERFGE 351 (1952), 1952 NJW 969.
115. There is no political question doctrine in West German jurisprudence. Zuck, Folt-
ical-Question-Doktrin, Judicial-self-restraint und das Bundesverfassungsgericht, 1974 JZ 361.
116. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
117. See Rupp, supra note 95, at 548.
118. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
119. Rupp, supra note 95, at 548.
120. Rupp, Judicial Review in the Federal Republic of Germany, 9 A.. J. Co iP. L. 29, 43-
44 (1960).
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In arbitrating disputes between the highest governmental organs, the
court undertakes the difficult task of isolating the legal issues from the
political conflicts out of which they arise. Only the legal issues are sub-
ject to review, but the political color of a dispute will not prevent the
court from applying legal standards to the legal issues. 2' Critics of the
Organstreit argue that the political branches of government may be
tempted to evade their duty to reach political solutions to difficult is-
sues by placing this burden upon the court.1 2 2 Some commentators
have also noted that the spectacle of one high governmental organ
reproaching the illegality of the actions of another before the Constitu-
tional Court may erode public confidence in the political system.'
2 3
On the other hand, the Organstreit is useful in that it allows the
Court to diffuse a political dispute somewhat by narrowing it to a legal
controversy. 124 The Organstreit also provides a check against unconsti-
tutional action by the majority coalition in the legislature by providing
the minority parties an avenue of protest after a parliamentary
defeat.
125
The Organstreit is an unusual form of judicial review, even for
nations which have a constitutional court similar to that of the Federal
Republic. The new Spanish Constitutional Court is not competent to
entertain constitutional disputes between organs of the government, al-
though its jurisdiction is otherwise quite similar to that of its West Ger-
man counterpart. 126 In Italy, the only justiciable controversies between
governmental organs are those involving constitutional assignments of
power over a given subject matter. 27 There is also no equivalent to the
Organstret in Austria. Austria's Constitutional Court may only adju-
dicate a limited class of jurisdictional disputes between the government
and the Court of Accounts.
28
The early dissolution of the Bundestag in December 1982 clearly
involved the sort of controversy which the Organstre/t was designed to
resolve. In its unanimous decision to take jurisdiction over the case,
121. Id. at 44.
122. Id.
123. The comment was made by Schille in a discussion recorded in Sandulli, stupra note
84 at 881-82.
124. Rupp, supra note 121, at 44.
125. This comment was made by Herlitz in a discussion recorded in Sandulli, supra note
84, at 877.
126. Faller, supra note 105, 1979 EuGRZ at 239 n.10.
127. Bralutigam, Streitigkeiten zwischen obersten Staalsorganen, in Sandulli, stqra note
105, at 745; COSTITUZIONE DELLA REPUBBLICA ITALIANA [COST] art. 134 (Italy).
128. Brautigam, supra note 127, at 746-47 and Appendix at 963; BUNDES-VERFASSUNOS-
GESETZ art. 126a (Aus.).
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the Federal Constitutional Court noted that the requisite concrete disa-
greement over the interpretation of article 68 of the Bonn Constitution
had arisen out of the federal president's dissolution of the Btndestag
before the expiration of the full legislative period. The president's ex-
ercise of the duties described in article 68 had ended the four-year
mandate given to deputies to the Bundestag in article 39(1) of the Bonn
Constitution. Although the four-year period is not guaranteed in the
constitution, the deputies were entitled to protection against loss of the
mandate through unconstitutional dissolution of the Btndestag. The
rights and duties of the parties thus turned on the court's interpretation
of article 68. Moreover, the federal president and the deputies were
proper parties to the action by virtue of the statute governing the
court's jurisdiction.
129
The substantive issues in the instant case also illustrate the institu-
tional and political concerns addressed by the Organstreit. The polit-
ical organs of the government had reached the decision to dissolve the
Bundestag by means of the vote of confidence only after a great deal of
consideration and debate. The public and the majority of deputies in
the Bundestag wanted and expected a new election.130 A decision by
the Constitutional Court declaring the dissolution procedures illegal
would have had serious political repercussions for all three branches of
government. The federal president, the government and the Bundestag
would have suffered a loss of public confidence for having "manipu-
lated" the constitution. Furthermore, because the court's judgment
would only have been declaratory, a delicate question would remain
unanswered as to whether the scheduled elections would have to be
cancelled. 13 1 Any action taken in this case would have been unsatisfac-
tory. Cancelling the elections would have disappointed the expecta-
tions of the general public, but a government put into office following
an "illegal" election would face problems of legitimacy worse than
those perceived by the new coalition in the fall of 1982. Finally, the
uncertainty caused by a judgment against the dissolution of the
Bundestag would doubtless have reflected poorly on the Constitutional
Court as well as on the executive and legislative branches, raising un-
129. 1983 EuGRZ at 65-66. It is interesting to note that the court refused to take juris-
diction over complaints brought by individual voters based on the Verfasungsbeschwerde
procedure described in note 104 supra. Judgments of Jan. 1, 1983 and Jan. 11, 1983, 1983
NJW 383. The individual voter has no protectable interest in the Bundestag's completion of
the four-year legislative period.
130. See supra text accompanying note 30.
131. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
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comfortable questions about the court's authority to intervene in polit-
ical affairs.
On the other hand, the decision of the Constitutional Court had
the potential for bringing clarity to a situation where clarity was badly
needed. The circumstances under which the 1982 dissolution occurred
were unique in the short parliamentary history of the Federal Republic
and neither the Bonn Constitution nor its legislative history provided
absolute answers. The political parties, involved as they were with
election campaigning, were in no position to reach disinterested, objec-
tive solutions. Allowing the Court to interpret the constitution in this
case prevented the constitution from being altered in practice by a
group of politicians more interested in political advantage than in con-
stitutional principle.
All of the above political and institutional considerations played a
role in the Constitutional Court's ultimate resolution of the dissolution
controversy. Arguably, these pragmatic considerations were of greater
importance to the Court's decision than were the purely theoretical
constitutional arguments. The pragmatic factors should therefore be
kept in mind as the discussion turns to the court's judgment on the
merits of the case.
B. The Court's Decision
In its lengthy opinion sustaining President Carsten's decision to
dissolve the Bundestag, the Constitutional Court first separated the re-
viewable legal issues from the nonreviewable political ones. The court
determined that article 68 committed dissolution of the Bundestag to
the discretion of the federal president, who could only exercise such
discretion under the circumstances set forth in the constitution. The
president's exercise of discretion was a political judgment and was not
reviewable. Whether the factual prerequisites for the exercise of discre-
tion had been fulfilled, however, was a separate legal issue which the
court could address.
132
The appropriateness of the president's exercise of discretion in
turn depended upon whether the federal chancellor had properly exer-
cised his discretion to introduce the motion for a vote of confidence
under article 68. Unconstitutional acts by the chancellor prior to the
time that the request for dissolution reached the president would fore-
close any action by the president. The court's major task thus became
one of defining those circumstances under which the federal chancellor
132. 1983 EuGRZ at 66.
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could constitutionally pose the motion for a vote of confidence. 33
Since the express language of article 68 does not address the pre-
requisites for a vote of confidence in the Bundestag, the court was
obliged to seek the "unwritten material factual criteria" applicable to
the provision. 34 The four methods of interpretation employed in this
effort include: 1) analysis of the language and structure of article 68,
2) examination of the historical background of the provision as seen in
the light of German constitutional history, 3) analysis of the interrela-
tionship of article 68 with other relevant provisions of the constitution
(the "normative context"), and 4) reference to constitutional practice in
the Federal Republic since 1949. The court developed its unwritten
constitutional criteria using these methods of interpretation.
In concluding that the wording of article 68 was not clear as to the
factual prerequisites for the vote of confidence, the court focused on the
use of the words "confidence" (Vertrauen) and "no-confidence" (Miss-
trauen) as used in articles 67 and 68. Contrary to the argument of the
complainants, the court did not construe the word "confidence" to re-
quire that the chancellor ask for a vote of confidence with the sole pur-
pose of securing the support of the majority in the legislature. Rather,
the court relied on the notion of "confidence" dating back to the 1918
amendment to the Constitution of 1871, in which the chancellor's status
was changed so that the office was dependent upon the support of a
majority in the parliament rather than the support of the monarch
alone. 3' Viewed in this light, a failure of members of the Bundestag to
express "confidence" in the chancellor does not necessarily imply that
they are passing a final moral judgment upon the chancellor's ability to
carry out the duties of office. Rather the use of the word "confidence"
in article 68 leaves open the possibility that disapproval of the govern-
ment's policies may not be the only reason a deputy fails to support the
chancellor in a vote of confidence. The court held:
[I]n the context of article 68 "confidence" means the contemporane-
ous agreement of the member of parliament to the person and pro-
gram of the federal chancellor, formally declared in the act of casting
his vote .... That this "confidence" can be put into question in a
parliamentary system by the members of parliament with every new
political development, and therefore is by its very nature not perma-
nently secured... is obvious... in light of the guarantee in article
133. Id.
134. Id. at 68. The Court used the term "ungeschriebenes sachliches Tatbestand-
smerkmal." (All translations fro the opinion are by the author.)
135. See supra text acommpoanying note 42.
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38(l)(2) of the Bonn Constitution of the free representative man-
date. . . .Article 68 applies to every federal chancellor, not solely to
the "minority chancellor" who strives for new elections. . . . The
words of the text alone do not foreclose the possibility that behind
the vote of confidence, the political will may have existed from the
outset to effect dissolution of the Bundestag in this way.1
3 6
By analyzing the structure of article 68, however, the court deter-
mined that the drafters of the Bonn Constitution had intended to make
the dissolution of the Bundestag difficult in order to promote govern-
ment stability. "The intent [of article 68] is to hinder the precipitous
dissolution of the Bundestag, and thereby to promote political stabil-
ity-without inflexibility, of course-in the relationship between the
Chancellor and theBundestag."'x  To insure that the dissolution of the
legislature be a carefully considered, necessary action, article 68 re-
quires that the federal chancellor, president, and Bundes/ag all take
part in the decision. Article 68 requires that each organ exercise its
independent judgment. The chancellor must decide to ask for the vote
of confidence; each deputy is free under article 38 to vote on the motion
as his or her conscience dictates, and the president must finally exercise
discretion in ordering the dissolution.1
31
In addition, article 68 provides several escape routes should disso-
lution later become unnecessary. For example, the Bundestag can in-
terrupt the proceeding from the outset by electing a new chancellor
under the constructive vote of no-confidence in article 67.139 This elec-
tion extinguishes the president's right to grant a request to dissolve
136. 1983 EuGRZ at 66-67. The Court's opinion reads as follows:
Auch im Rahmen des Art. 68 GG meint Vertrauen die im Akt der Stimmabgabe
formlich bekundete gegenwirtige Zustimmung der Abgeordneten zu Persor und
Sachprogramm des Bundeskanzlers.... Dap3 im parlamentarisehen System
dieses "Vertrauen" mit jeder neuen Beurteilung und Einschtltzung der gegebencn
politischen Lage, durch die Abgeordneten in Frage gestellt werden kann, also von
Natur aus nicht auf Dauer versichert wird, versteht sich letztlich im Blick auf die
GewAhrleistung des reprisentativen freien Abgeordnetenmandats in Art. 38 Abs. I
Satz 2 GG von selbst.... Art. 68 GG gilt for jeden Bundeskanzler, nicht ledig-
lich fMr den "Minderheitskanzler", der Neuwahlenanstrebt.... Der Wortlaut al-
lein schliep3t es nicht aus, da3 hinter der Vertrauensfrage von vornherein der
politisehe Wille stehen darf, auf diesem Wege zur Auflosung des Bundestages zu
gelangen....
137. Id. at 67. The court stated: (Die in Art. 68 GG Angelegte Systematik) will cinc
verscbnelle Auflisung des Bundestages verhindern und damit zu politiseher Stabilitat im
Verh~qltnis von Bundeskanzler und Bundestag freilich nicht zu politiseher Unbewegliehkeit
beitragen.




brought by the defeated chancellor. The federal president can also stop
the dissolution proceedings by refusing to comply with the chancellor's
request for dissolution. The president's right to dissolve is automati-
caly extinguished if the chancellor's request is not acted upon within
21 days. A chancellor who loses a vote of confidence is not required to
ask for dissolution, but may continue in office as head of a minority
government. The chancellor can also prevent dissolution at the last
minute by refusing to countersign the dissolution order as required
under article 68 of the Constitution.140
In analyzing the historical background of article 68, the court com-
pared the Bonn Constitution with its historical antecedents and investi-
gated its legislative history.14 1  Similar to its construction of the
wording and structure of article 68, the court concluded that although
the Bonn Constitution does not require the chancellor to have lost the
majority in the Bundestag before posing the motion for a vote of confi-
dence, the use of this device to achieve dissolution is not unlimited.
Comparison of the 1949 Bonn Constitution with the 1919 Weimar
Constitution revealed to the court that the Bonn Constitution had been
planned with the stability of the government in mind. The court noted,
for example, that the "destructive" vote of no-confidence allowed
under the Weimar Constitution had been replaced in 1949 by the "con-
structive" vote in article 67, which was designed to prevent the opposi-
tion from toppling one government without replacing it with a new one
capable of conducting state affairs. Moreover, the nearly unlimited
140. 1983 EuGRZ at 67.
141. The court made the following remarks as to the role of the legislative history in its
construction of the Bonn Constitution:
The Federal Constitutional Court has repeatedly declared with respect to laws
not having constitutional stature that the legislative materials should be drawn
upon with caution, only to support an interpretation, and collectively only insofar
as they lead to conclusions about the 'objective substance of the statute. .. .' The
so-called will of the legislator. . . can be accordingly considered in the interpreta-
tion only insofar as it has found expression in the text. The legislative materials
may not mislead the reader to equate the subjective concepts of the legislative stage
with the objective substance of the statute.
It is unclear whether these principles may also apply in the same fashion to
constitutional norms, because the openness of the text is more of a problem with
the interpretation of the constitution than it is with the interpretation of a law of
lesser stature .... Particularly with regard to the organizational part of the con-
stitution to which article 68 belongs, the task of constitutional interpretation is un-
derstood to allow room for varying formal possibilities... . Nonetheless, the
legislative history of a constitutional norm cannot remain completely unconsid-
ered. ... In any case, the legislative materials are as a rule not given determina-
tive meaning [in constitutional interpretation].
Id. at 69.
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right of the Weimar president to dissolve the parliament had been
sharply curtailed to the situations described in articles 63 and 68 of the
Bonn Constitution. Nonetheless, the court could not conclude from
these changes alone that dissolution under the instant fact situation was
entirely forbidden by the Bonn Constitution.'42 "From the point of
view of constitutional history, the thrust of article 68 is not primarily
against a right to self-dissolution by the Bundestag; rather, it is against
the unlimited right to dissolve that was in practice. . . enjoyed by the
president under the Weimar Constitution ... ,43
The court's examination of the legislative history of the Bonn Con-
stitution as contained in the documents of the parliamentary council
led it to a similar conclusion. The discussion of article 68 by members
of the council centered upon the role which it would play in the case of
a chancellor who had lost the majority in the Bundestag. Other scena-
rios were not considered at length. The court did not imply from this
fact, however, that the council had intended article 68 only for use by a
minority chancellor.
That article 68 should only be employed in the cases discussed by the
parliamentary council, and that it should only open the way for new
elections in those cases, cannot be established. The legislative intent
was to create a norm which would define limits without unduly re-
stricting the freedom necessary to the political process, and which
would exorcise the dangers to the stability of the new republic appar-
ent upon retrospective consideration of the Weimar Republic. The
intent was not to design a "cure-all" for all imaginable conflicts.
Rather, the drafters wished to create a provision that would effec-
tively insure against all misuse. . . by requiring the participation of
chancellor, Bundestag and president. ... 144
Although the court's analysis of the historical background and in-
142. Id. at 68.
Verfassungsgeschichtlich gesehen geht die Stol3richtung des Art. 68 GG nicht in
erster Linie gegen ein Selbstauflosungsrecht des Bundestages, sondern gegen das
praktisch unbegrente Auflesungsrecht...
143. Id.
144. Id. at 69.
Dap3 Art. 68 GG nur auf die im Parlamentarischen Rat angesprochencn
Fallgestaltungen Anwendung finden und nur insoweit einen Weg zu Neuwahlcn
er~ffnen soilte, 1ip3t sich sonach nicht feststellen. Man wollte eine Norm schaffcn,
die Grenzen setzt und die im Rilckblick auf Weimar vor Augen stehcndcn
Gefahren ffir die Stabilitltt der neuen Republik bannen sollte, ohne den
notwendigen politischen Freiraum iber Gebtihr einzuschranken. Nicht eine
"Patentlbsung" ffir ale denkbaren Konfliktsfhile solte gesehaffen werden, sondcrn
eine Bestimmung, die durch ihre besondere Ausgestaltung, die Beteiligung von
Bundeskanzler, Bundestag und BundesprIsident mit den daraus folgenden Wech-
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ternal structure of article 68 led it to conclude that a majority chancel-
lor was not foreclosed from using the vote of confidence mechanism for
early dissolution of the Bundestag, these methods of interpretation did
not clearly define the limits on the chancellor's actions. The court
found the definition of these boundaries in the "normative context" of
article 68, that is, in its interaction with other provisions of the Bonn
Constitution relevant to the dissolution issue. The provisions consid-
ered by the court were articles 63, 67, and 39.
The court's reading of article 63(4) together with article 68 led it to
conclude that early dissolution under these provisions was intended to
be used as a threat to coerce members of the Bundestag to choose a
majority chancellor or face losing their seats in a new election. The
purpose of this threat was to force the formation of a government capa-
ble of conducting state business. Therefore, the possibility of early dis-
solution could only be available where there is a question as to the
government's effectiveness.'
45
It does not do justice to the purpose of article 68 to construe it to
permit a federal chancellor certain of a sufficient majority in the
Bundestag to ask for a negative response to a vote of confidence in
order to effect the dissolution of the Bundestag at a time which ap-
pears convenient to him. Likewise, particular difficulties in perform-
ing the tasks which arise during the course of the legislative session
do not justify dissolution.
146
The court further determined that articles 67 and 38(l) foreclosed
the use of article 68 to "legitimize" a decision reached by the govern-
ment in a constitutionally permissible manner. The court recalled that
the principles of "representative democracy" in article 38(1) permitted
a member of the Bundestag to vote according to the dictates of his or
her conscience without the need to return to his or her constituents for
approval. This principle was evidenced by the fact that the construc-
tive vote of no-confidence in article 67 provided for the election of a
new chancellor without requiring approval of the choice by the voters.
selwirkungen und Prtafungspffichten eine greifende Sicherung gegen jeden Mip3
brauch gewahrleistet.
145. Id. at 68.
Eine Auslegung dahin, dap3 Art. 68 GG einem Bundeskanzler, dessen ausreichende
Mehrheit im Bundestag aul3er Zweifel steht, gestattet, sich zum geeignet er-
scheinenden Zeitpunkt die Vertrauensfrage negativ beantworten zu lassen mit dem
Ziel, die Auflbsung des Bundestages zu betreiben, warde dem Sinn des Art. 68 GG
nicht gerecht. Desgleichen rechtfertigen besondere Schwierigkeiten der in der
laufenden Wahlperiode sich stellenden Aufgaben die Aufldsung nicht.
146. Id.
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In particular, it is a fundamental misunderstanding of the meaning
of article 68 and the constitutionally embodied principle of represen-
tative democracy to demand dissolution of the Bundestag and new
elections with the assertion that a chancellor elected by means of a
constructive vote of no-confidence needs legitimacy procured
through new elections in addition to his constitutional legality.1
47
Finally, the court interpreted the four-year legislative period set
forth in article 39 as further evidence that the Bundestag should only be
dissolved when the government was no longer capable of effectively
performing its duties.
Article 39(1) sentence 1 of the Bonn Constitution gesetz is not merely
a technical determination. . . for the periodic renewal of the man-
date of the representatives. It is also intended to secure the effective-
ness of the parliament in a modem mass democracy. It should only
be possible to shorten the legislative period under the peculiar, grave
circumstances prescribed in articles 63(4) and 68. .... 148
In light of the above interpretations of article 68 in connection
with articles 63(4), 67, and 39, the Constitutional Court set forth the
following standard for the invocation of article 68.
The federal chancellor who attempts to dissolve the Bundestag by
means of article 68 should be permitted to employ this procedure
only when he no longer has the political assurance that he can govern
further given the political constellation that exists in the Bundestag.
The political constellation in the Bundestag must impair or cripple
his ability to act to such an extent that he is significantly unable to
pursue a political program supported by a stable majority. These are
the unwritten material factual criteria set forth in article 68. They
must be met in order for an individual proceeding under article 68 to
be in accordance with the constitution.
1 49
147. Id. In German:
Insbesondere verfehlt es grundlegend den Sian des Art. 68 GG wic der yom
Grundgesetz geformten reprasentativen Demokratie, die Auflosung des
Bundestages und Neuwahlen mit der Behauptung zu fordem, ein tiber cin kon-
strukfives Miptrauensvotum neu gewtilter Bundeskanzler bedtlrfe neben seiner
verfassungsmttPigen Legalitat noch einer durch Nuewahlen vermittelten
legitimitat.
148. Id. at 69. The German text reads:
Art. 39 Abs. 1 Satz 1 GG ist nicht lediglich eine wahltechnisch gemeintc
Festlegung ffr die vom Demokratiegrundsatz geforderte periodische Erneuerung
der Mandate der Volksvertreter. Sie will auch die Arbeitstthigkeit des Parlaments
in einer modernen Massendemokratie sichern. Die Wahlperiode abzuktirzen, soil
nur aus besonderen und schwerwiegenden Grtinden, wie sic in Art. 63 Abs. 4 Satz
3 GG und Art. 68 festgelegt siad, moglich sein....
149. Id. at 68.
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The court cited political practices in the Federal Republic since
1949 as evidence to support its standard. The only precedent for early
dissolution under article 68 was the 1972 vote of confidence requested
by Chancellor Willy Brandt. The procedures in articles 81 and 63(4)
had never been used and the constructive vote of no-confidence had
only been attempted twice; once unsuccessfully in 1972 and again in
1982 to elect Helmut Kohl. This finding demonstrated the restraint
with which the dissolution procedures had been employed. The prac-
tice of the West German political organs expressed a strong preference
for forming an effective parliamentary majority by means other than
returning to the voters. The court, however, explained the exceptional
1972 dissolution by noting that Chancellor Brandt had used the article
68 procedure as a crisis management device after he had lost his major-
ity in the Bundestag. Brandt's actions had not brought about a change
of the constitution in practice; they had been fully in accordance with
the requirements of article 68.150
In applying its dissolution standard to the facts at hand, the Con-
stitutional Court held that Chancellor Kohl's motion for a vote of con-
fidence was constitutionally permissible because he was faced with a
crisis situation similar to that faced by Chancellor Brandt in 1972. The
court held that, "because of the extraordinary situation in which the
deputies of one of the coalition parties found themselves after the col-
lapse of the former coalition, the federal chancellor had reason in De-
cember 1982 to believe that a lasting, stable parliamentary majority
could no longer be brought into existence."'' As evidence for the "ex-
traordinary situation," the court cited the upheaval which had occurred
in the FDP following the termination of its partnership with the SPD.
The change of coalition partner caused a great deal of strife within the
party, and in the Land elections between September and December
Der Bundeskanzler, der die Auflosung des Bundestages auf dem Weg des Art. 68
GG anstrebt, soil dieses Verfahrennur anstrengen dtlrfen, wenn es politisch Mbr ihn
nicht mehr gew~hrleistet ist, mit den im Bundestag bestehcnden Krafteverhiltnis-
sen weiter zu regieren. Die politischen KrAfteverhaltniss im Bundestag massen
seine Handlungsf~iigkeit so beintr-achtigen [sic] oder lahmen, da3 cr ein voam ste-
tigen Vertrauen der Mehrheit getragene Politik nicht sinnvoll zu verfolgen vermag.
Dies ist ungeschriebenes sachliches Tatbestandsmerkmal des Art. 68 Abs. 1 Satz I
GG; es mu3 erfbdllt sein, damit ein Verfahren nach Art. 68 GG im Einzelfall
verfassungsgemR43 isL
150. Id. at 70.
151. Id. at 71. "Der Bundeskanzler hatte im Dezember 1982 Anlap3, davon auszugehen,
dap aufgrund der aup3ergew6hlichen Lage, in der sich die Abgeordnetcn einer Koalifions-
partei nach der Beendigung der bisherigen Koalition befanden, cinc daucrhafte stabile
parlamentarische Mehrheit nicht zustande gebracht werden konnte."
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1982, the FDP lost its seats in three of the Landtage (Hessen, Bavaria,
and Hamburg).'52 Further proof of Kohl's wavering majority was the
fact that the CD U/CSU and FDP had only been able to agree to lim-
ited cooperative measures to correct the economic course of the nation.
The parties had not agreed on detailed, long-range plans and had ex-
pressed unwillingness to do so without new elections. These factors
made it plausible that Chancellor Kohl had posed the motion for a vote
of confidence out of concern for his majority.'" The court found con-
sideration of other possibly unconstitutional motivations, such as the
desire to bring "legitimacy" to the new government, irrelevant.'
5 4
Five of the Constitutional Court's eight justices joined the major-
ity opinion. Justice Rottmann filed a separate opinion supporting the
majority's theoretical discussion, but disagreeing with the court's find-
ing that the facts supported the majority's conclusion. In Justice
Rottmann's view, the fact that the leaders of the CDU/CSU and FDP
had agreed to March elections as a condition of the coalition agreement
militated against an interpretation that Kohl's parliamentary base had
become shaky by December 1982. 5 Kohl's success at passing the 1983
budget on the day prior to his request for a vote of confidence was
further evidence that he possessed a secure majority and a factor which
distinguished his case from Chancellor Brandt's 1972 stalemate. 5 6 Fi-
nally, Justice Rottmann refused to accept as proof of a faltering parlia-
mentary base the government's argument that the coalition had been
formed on a limited basis to reach only immediate stopgap solutions to
the nation's economic woes. 157 In Justice Rottmann's opinion, such
agreements were unforeseen in the Bonn Constitution and could not be
used to fabricate a crisis.'
58
Justice Zeidler agreed in his separate opinion that the dissolution
of the Bundestag was within the limits of the constitution, but based his
conclusions on a different theoretical premise. Like Justice Rottmann,
he considered the "limited assignment" theory a faulty basis for legisla-
152. Id. at 71-72.
153. Id. at 73.
154. Id. As to other motives, the court stated:
The question of whether the Chancellor's decision was accompanied by other mo-
tives is not determinative. Article 68 requires along with its procedural prerequi-
sites and substantive criteria no additional negative prerequisite such as the
absence of further motivations which taken alone would not be constitutionally
acceptable grounds for the dissolution of the Bundestag.
155. Id. at 87.
156. Id. at 87-88.
157. See supra note 23.
158. 1983 EuGRZ at 88.
(Vol. 7
West German Parliament
tive emergency because the theory was not constitutionally permit-
ted."'59 In Justice Zeidler's opinion, permitting such agreements would
allow the political parties to shorten the legislative period to suit their
wishes, in effect changing the constitution in violation of article 79(1).
To support the dissolution, Justice Zeidler identified a different legisla-
tive emergency. He declared that a change in constitutional purpose
(Bedeutungswandel) affecting the role of the chancellor had occurred in
practice since the founding of the Federal Republic. The drafters of
the constitution had imagined that the voters would not participate di-
rectly in electing the chancellor, under the theory of representative de-
mocracy, the voters entrusted this duty to the deputies of the
Bundestag. Justice Zeidler argued that, in reality, the election of the
chancellor proved to be the major concern of the voters, who cast their
votes for deputy with an eye to whom the deputies would elect as chan-
cellor. Justice Zeidler noted that during the 1980 campaign, the FDP
had used the slogan "A vote for the .FDP guarantees that Helmut
Schmidt remains chancellor." Such practices had introduced elements
of direct democracy into the election process, and a drastic change in
the policy of a political party halfway through the legislative session
could result in unrest among the voters who had cast their ballots with
certain expectations. In short, a new coalition might need "legitimiza-
tion" in order to function effectively.
In this light, it appears plausible that a chancellor called into
office under article 67 might feel burdened with a lack of credibility
that detracts from the authority of his office. Skepticism among
members of the general public could penetrate into the circle of his
own organized supporters, and cripple his political effectiveness by
giving him the reputation of a 'second-rate chancellor.
' 160
In the third and final opinion, Justice Rinck, using the same ana-
159. Id. at 75.
160. Ird. The German text reads:
Vor diesem Hintergrund erscheint es plausibel, dap ein gemtf3 Art. 67 GG ins Amt
berufener Bundeskanzler sich mit einem Glaubwtlrdigkeitsdefizit behaflet fohlen
mag, das seine Amtsautorittt mindert. Skepsis in der Bcvl1kerung allgemein
konnte durchschlagen bis in den Kreis der eigenen organisierten Anhtangerschaft
und durch den Ruch eines "Kanzlers zweiter Gate" die rolitische Handlung-
sf!higkeit lahmen.
The German voter has two votes in the election to the Bundestag. The first vote operates to
directly elect an individual candidate to the Bundestag. The second vote is for the party list.
This vote decides the proportional strength of each party in the Bundestag; parties receiving
less than five percent of the second votes may not be represented in the Bundestag. In prac-
tice, the second vote has become much more important than the first vote. See
Bundeswahlgesetz (Federal Election Law) of May 7, 1956, 1956 BGBI 1393, §§ 1-7.
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lytical techniques that were employed by the majority, concluded that
the early dissolution was unconstitutional. In Justice Rinck's view, the
use of the word "confidence" in article 68 meant that "[tihe government
comes into office and remains in office if and for as long as it is sup-
ported by the majority of the members of parliament."' 61 Seen in this
light, the text of article 68 forecloses an agreement between the chan-
cellor and his supporters in the Bundestag that the chancellor be de-
feated on the vote of confidence to advance the chancellor's political
purpose to dissolve the Bundestag. Article 68 can only be used when
there is a genuine question of confidence in the government. 62
Justice Rinck's analysis of the legislative history of article 68 also
proved that "a dissolution of the Bundestag-under article 63(4) or ar-
ticle 68-should only be possible when the Bundestag is not able to
build an effective government."'163 In support of this conclusion, Rinck
cited extensive passages from the records of the parliamentary council
in which the drafters of the Bonn Constitution expressed concern over
instability caused by a government with a shaky basis of support in the
parliament. 64
Like the majority, Justice Rinck's interpretation of article 68 in its
"normative context" required extreme circumstances before the provi-
sion could be used as a mechanism for early dissolution.
Articles 63, 67, 68, and 81 as seen together build a system of mutual
checks and balances. The goal of this balanced system is to insure
that the tasks of the government are always carried out by an effec-
tive executive branch .... A dissolution of the Bundestag under ar-
ticle 68 despite the continuing existence of a majority capable ... of
building a government by electing a chancellor candidate under arti-
cle 67 would turn the balanced system of articles 63, 67, 68, and 81
on its head'
65
Proof that this system had not been altered through practical applica-
161. Id. at 76. In German: "Die Regierung kommt ins Amt und bleibt im Amt, wenn
und solange sie von einer Mehrheit der Mitglieder des Parlaments getragen wird."
162. Id.
163. Id. at 85. In German: "Die Entstehungsgeschichte erweist somit eindeutig, da3 clne
Auflbsung des Bundestages-nach Art. 63 Abs. 4 oder nach Art. 68 GG-nur mliglich scn
solte, wean der Bundestag nicht in der Lage ware, eine handlungsllhige Regierung zu
bilden."
164. Id. at 80-84.
165. Id. at 77. The German text reads: "Art. 63, 67, 68 und 81 GG bilden zusammen
gesehen ein System der gegenseitigen Gewaltenhemmung. Ziel dieses ausbalancierten Sys-
tems ist, da3 die Regierungsaufgaben stets von einer handlungsflhigen Exekutive wahrge-
nommen werden. Insofern kommt der Aufltsung des Bundestages, die an cnge
Tatbestandsvoraussetzungen geknflpft ist, nur eine begrenzte Funktion zu."
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tion was found in the fact that the Enqure Commission's 1976 propo-
sal for a self-dissolution amendment had not been passed by the
Bundestag. In Justice Rinck's opinion, this confirmed that the pos-
sibilities for dissolution were still limited to those available under the
Bonn Constitution as drafted in 1949. The creation of a broader right
of dissolution was permissible only through passage of an amendment
under article 79 of the Bonn Constitution. 66
Finally, Justice Rinck disagreed with the majority that the 1972
dissolution under the Brandt government was of precedential value in
the instant case. Like Justice Rottmann, Justice Rinck was of the opin-
ion that the situation in 1972 was distinguishable in that the Brandt
government had been unable to find a majority in the parliament for its
proposed budgetary legislation. This was not the case for Chancellor
Kohl in 1982.167 Justice Rinck also agreed with Justices Rottmann and
Zeidler that governmental instability could not be based on the "lim-
ited assignment" purportedly undertaken by the coalition partners at
the time that Chancellor Kohl was elected.'68 Justice Rinck proposed
the following standard to govern the use of article 68 in dissolving the
Bundestag:
The dissolution of the Bundestag is only permissible under article 68
when there is no majority with the capacity to govern, or when it has
become uncertain if such a majority exists.... [A] dissolution of
the Bundestag does not come into question when, solely because he
anticipates that a party caucus which has been supporting him will
not continue to completely go along with his future political plans,
the chancellor poses a vote of confidence, and with the agreement of
his political supporters allows the vote to be defeated in order to
open the possibility of new elections. As long as the failure of the
vote of confidence is not the expression of a current crisis in the gov-
ernment which has caused the government to lose its ability to carry
out its political intentions with the support of the majority of the
parliament, the legal prerequisites for a dissolution of the Bundestag
are lacking.1
69
166. Id. at 79. The first sentence of article 79 states: 'This Basic Law can be amended
only by laws which expressly amend or supplement the text thereof."
167. Id. at 79-80.
168. Id. at 79.
169. Id. at 85.
Alle Auslegungsmethoden Mthren damit Obereinstimmend zu dem Ergebnis, da3
die Auflosung des Bundestages nach Art. 68 GG nur zulIssig ist, wean eine
regierungsfbhige Mehrheit fehlt oder unsicher geworden ist. Von daher erschliel3t
sich der Sian der Vertrauensfrage: Es soil festgestelt werden, ob die Regierung
tatsachlich noch fiber die erforderliche parlamentarische Unterstiltzung verflgt.
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A close reading of the Constitutional Court's four opinions reveals
that all of the eight justices were in general agreement as to the theoret-
ical legal prerequisites for posing the vote of confidence; they all re-
quired that the chancellor be faced with some extraordinary legislative
emergency. The chancellor who requests a vote of confidence must do
so with the proper motivation. The provisions of article 68 may be
used for purposes other than consolidating a parliamentary majority
only where the government is faced with a crisis making it impossible
for state business to be effectively carried out. The real division in the
court arose over the factual situations which would give rise to a chan-
cellor's inability to perform. For some of the justices, a stalemate situa-
tion such as that which Chancellor Brandt faced in 1972 was a
sufficient crisis. For others, notably Zeidler, a lack of public confidence
in the chancellor could also cause such a crisis.
The problem of applying legal theory to the instant fact situation
vividly illustrates the difficulty of the Constitutional Court's position
when it exercises jurisdiction to review conflicts between the political
organs of the government. On the one hand, it is the court's duty to
interpret the constitution and to guard against illegal manipulation of
its provisions by the political organs of government. On the other
hand, the court must realize that in the adjudication of disputes over
the rights and duties of the political organs, the credibility of these or-
gans is at stake. Tarnishing the credibility of the highest governmental
organs could easily damage public confidence in the entire constitu-
tional system. Given a young democracy such as the Federal Republic,
both of these considerations are particularly important. The institution
of the Organstreit in fact reflects the concern that a balance be main-
tained between control and credibility. Permitting the Constitutional
Court to state the law regarding interdepartmental disputes without
giving it the power to declare particular acts legally void can be seen as
an attempt to reconcile the problems of reviewing the acts of other gov-
Wird die Vertrauensfrage nicht mit diesem Ziel gestellt, vermag elne
Abstimmungsniederlage des Bundeskanzlers die Auflbsung des Bundestages nicht
zu rechtfertigen. Insbesondere kommt eine Aufldsung des Bundestages auch dann
nicht in Bretracht, wean ein Bundeskanzler lediglich aus der Befarchtung, da3
eine der ihn sttitzenden Fraktionen seine far die Zukunft geplante Politik nicht
vollstaindig mittragen werde, die Vertrauensfrage stelit und sich im Einverstaindnis
seiner parteifreunde das erbetene Vertrauen verweigem lip3t, um auf diese Weise
den Weg zu Neuwahlen zu eroffnen. Solange die Abstimmungsniederlage nicht
Ausdruck einer gegenwartigen Regierungskrise ist, in der die Bundesregierung ire
Filhigkeit eingebtil3t hat, mit Untersttltzung der Mehrheit des Parlaments




ernmental organs with the perceived necessity for such review.170
Despite the need for judicial review and the institutional hedges,
the problems involved with passing legal judgment on acts intimately
tied to the political process are exceedingly difficult. The majority
opinion's treatment of the facts in the instant case can best be under-
stood as a product of this dilemma. The majority opinion's comparison
of the situation of the Kohl government in 1982 with that of the Brandt
government in 1972 represents a naked manipulation of the facts in
order to bring Chancellor Kohl's motion for a vote of confidence
within the limits which the Court drew for article 68. The majority
failed to meet the argument advanced by Justices Rinck and Rottmann
that the 1972 dissolution was quite unlike the dissolution of 1982.
Brandt had lost his parliamentary majority in 1972; the same cannot be
said of Chancellor Kohl. By analogizing the Kohl dissolution to the
Brandt dissolution, however, the court avoided the awkward position
of embarrassing the federal president, the chancellor, and Bundestag, by
declaring their actions unconstitutional. At the same time, the standard
set forth in the majority opinion could be seen as a warning to future
governments that attempts to dissolve the Bundestag without the proper
factual basis would be looked upon with disfavor by the court. Accord-
ing to Ernst Benda, the president of the court (who did not participate
in the judgment), the majority opinion evidenced the clear intent that
the court "will not allow the dam to break."' 7'
The problems of applying legal theory to political problems can be
seen in the majority opinion's theoretical analysis as well as in its eval-
uation of the facts. The majority opinion was the court's first definitive
statement in an area which had been subject to question since 1950. It
did not eliminate all the doubts concerning early dissolution under arti-
cle 68. One issue raised by the commentators during the months prior
to the court's decision was the extent to which the court could test the
motivations of the chancellor who poses the motion for a vote of confi-
dence.' The court's requirement that the chancellor be in doubt of
his or her ability to effectively control the government presumes that
the court can test whether the chancellor's perception of the political
climate is honest and correct. While the evidence in this case gives a
fairly clear indication that Chancellor Kohl had a secure parliamentary
base, cases in which the evidence is not so clear can certainly be
imagined. Absent clear, objective evidence, it would be hard to deter-
170. See supra text accompanying notes 112-114.
171. Die DMnme nicht brechen lassen, DER SPIEGEL, Feb. 21, 1983, at 17, 20.
172. See supra text accompanying note 68.
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mine the legality of the chancellor's purpose. 71
Furthermore, testing the chancellor's motives may indirectly in-
volve the impossible task of testing the motives of the deputies who
vote or fail to vote for the chancellor. Even if the deputies' motives
could objectively be determined, such an attempt would arguably vio-
late the protection of the deputies' freedom of conscience as guaranteed
in article 38 of the Bonn Constitution.
174
The majority opinion also does not adequately take into account
the fact that a chancellor may have multiple motives for desiring disso-
lution, not all of which meet the majority opinion's tests. The major-
ity's statement that only one of the chancellor's motives be
constitutionally acceptable175 leaves open the possibility that a chancel-
lor may fabricate a "proper" motive to accompany improper ones,
leaving the court with the problem of determining whether the
"proper" motive is plausible enough to support the chancellor's
actions. 176
Requiring the chancellor to justify a request for dissolution by ac-
counting for its motivation is an unusually strict measure in light of
other Western European parliamentary systems. In no other Western
European nation is the head of state required by law to state a motiva-
tion for requesting early dissolution. In fact, most nations do not pre-
scribe in their constitutions any particular conditions for dissolution as
restrictive as those in the Bonn Constitution. Leaders of these Western
European nations generally state their motivations for dissolution in
practice, but such rationales are not subject to judicial scrutiny. The
decision to dissolve the legislative body is left to the discretion of the
political leaders.
177
A further problem is raised by the court's insistence that a dissolu-
tion of the Bundestag cannot be justified by the desire to submit a con-
troversial political decision to the voters for "legitimization." Only
Justice Zeidler recognized that the pressure for more direct public par-
ticipation in important political decisions was of great significance in
explaining the actions of the CDU/CSU and FDP in the fall and win-
ter of 1982.178 Continued failure by the court to admit that this element
plays a role in West German politics may prove to be unrealistic, espe-
173. See Gusseck, Bundestagsauflasung kraft Richterspruch?, 1983 NJW 721.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 54-55.
175. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
176. See Gusseck, supra note 173, at 723.
177. K. VON BE YME, supra note 63, at 853.
178. See supra text accompanying note 160.
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cially as West Germans become more experienced with the democratic
process. In future cases similar to the instant case, for example, the
court's attitude toward the legitimization problem may inhibit the use
of the constructive vote of no-confidence to place a more effective
chancellor into office. Political parties concerned about their relation-
ship with the voters may be more reluctant to change coalition partners
without the possibility of submitting their actions to scrutiny by the
voters. The desire for increased public participation has been ex-
pressed in the past and is likely to grow in the future. This desire is a
force that will have to be accounted for in the political system, at least
with regard to the election of the chancellor.
Although the decision of February 16, 1983 left certain thorny
problems unresolved for the future, it met the immediate need of deter-
mining whether or not the March 6 election was constitutionally per-
missible. The court's judgment was welcomed by President Carstens
and by the leaders of all the political parties, who set about campaign-
ing in earnest. 7 9 On March 6, 1983, with 89.1 percent of the eligible
voters participating, the CDU/CS U won a decisive majority of 48.8
percent of the votes, a 4.3 percent gain from the 1980 election. The
SPD obtained 38.2 percent of the votes, a drop of 7.2 percent from
1980. The FDP was able to overcome the five precent hurdle with 6.9
percent of the votes, a loss of 4 percent from 1980. The "Greens" also
won a place in the parliament for the first time, capturing 5.6 percent of
the vote. 180 The election results confirmed the decisive shift in West
German domestic policy which had occurred in the fall of 1982.
While the effects of the March election results were immediately
felt on the West German political scene, the events leading up to the
election will doubtless have an equally important, if more subdued, im-
pact on the character of the Federal Republic. With regard to future
early dissolution, it remains to be seen in practice whether, as Justice
Benda terms it, the "dam" will hold under the current state of the law,
or whether, as one prominent commentator has noted, "the locks are
open."'' It seems likely in any case that the new government will con-
sider a constitutional amendment in this area; a well-drafted, carefully
considered change might end the uncertainty over early dissolution
once and for all.
179. See, ag., Morbitz, Bundesprasident sieht sich bestittigi, Frankfurter Rundschau, Feb.
17, 1983, at 1.
180. Die Wende istperfekt, Da SPIEGEL, March 7, 1983, at 9.
181. Leicht, Die Richter haben sich gebeugt, Stiddeutsche Zeitung, Feb. 17, 1983, at 4.
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III. A LOOK AHEAD
The most likely resolution of the dilemma left in the wake of the
dissolution controversy appears to be an amendment to the Bonn Con-
stitution allowing for self-dissolution of the Bundestag. Such an
amendment was suggested by Willy Brandt in 1966 following the up-
heaval in the Erhard government1 12 and was proposed again in 1976 by
the Enqu&e Commission in response to the controversy over the 1972
dissolution.'83 According to the Enqu&re Commission's proposal, sub-
mission of a motion for self-dissolution to a vote would require the
support of one-fourth of the members of the Bundes/ag. For passage,
two-thirds of the deputies would have to vote in favor of dissolution.
1 4
Self-dissolution is rare among the world's western-style parliamen-
tary governments. 8 5 This is probably because the flexible provisions
for dissolution by the head of state make parliamentary self-dissolution
unnecessary. Of the Federal Republic's West European neighbors,
only Austria's Nationalrat has the power to dissolve itself.1 8 6 This is
accomplished by a law passed by a simple majority. 18 7 The power of
self-dissolution exists in addition to the power of the government to
dissolve and has become a tool of the government and its majority in
the Nationalrat to bring about elections at a time favorable to them.1
8 8
Self-dissolution occurs to end the legislative period in Austria as a mat-
ter of course; it is a rare parliament which survives to the end of the full
legislative session.
In Israel, self-dissolution by the Knesset operates as a substitute for
dissolution by the head of state, which is not allowed in the Israeli sys-
tem.'8 9 As in Austria, dissolution takes place after a majority of the
representatives present pass a law ending the legislative session.190 Un-
like the Austrian practice, however, dissolution is an unfavored proce-
dure which has occurred relatively infrequently. Self-dissolution has
been primarily used when the Knesset has been unable to form a ma-
182. Die Verfassung ist kein schweizer Ktzse, DER SPIEGEL, Sept. 19, 1966, at 43.
183. See supra text accompanying notes 68-70.
184. Enquite Report, supra note 49, at 32-48.
185. PARLIAMENTS, supra note 55, at 286.
186. BUNDES-VERFASSUNGSGESETZ, art. 29; Wolf & vonWelck, supra note 61, at 139-40.
187. Id.
188. Widder, Parlamentsauflsung und Regierungsbildung in ii.sterrekch, 1972 ZPARL 86,
90.
189. K. voN BEYME, supra note 63, at 393.
190. Knesset (Basic Law), 12 L.S.I. 85, § 34 (Isr.). An English version of the text can be




jority government. 191 It is interesting to note that the Israelis also
looked to the Weimar Republic as a negative model of parliamentary
government and considered hedging their self-dissolution provision
with a restriction that would have prohibited dissolution within one
year after a general election. This restriction was not accepted how-
ever, because it was considered unrealistic to attempt to force the for-
mation of a majority government where no real agreement between the
political parties existed. Furthermore, restrictions on self-dissolution
would have the undesirable effect of permitting a minority government
to conduct state business in case no majority could be formed. In the
words of one Israeli commentator, "The Knesset, it is suggested, was
well advised to reject this proposition and trust the good sense of the
electorate and their natural inclination to exercise their franchise in a
way calculated to enable the Knesset to 'produce' a Government that
could govern."' 192
Within the Federal Republic itself, self-dissolution is a familiar
institution. The parliaments in nine of the eleven West German
Lander have the power of self-dissolution. In some cases this provision
makes up for the lack of a head of state who can dissolve the legislative
body.'93 For the Landtage, self-dissolution in practice functions as a
last resort solution to resolve situations where the government is unable
to operate effectively, or where it has lost its legitimacy.' 94 In Bavaria,
Hamburg, Hessen, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Rhineland-Pfalz and Schles-
wig-Holstein, the votes of a majority of all Landiag members will sup-
port self-dissolution.' 95 Given the fact that the governments of these
Lander and their parliamentary majorities function virtually as a unit,
this scheme enables dissolution of the legislature in a manner similar to
the procedure in Great Britain.
19 6
In the remaining three Lander, the obstacles to self-dissolution are
greater. Berlin and the Saarland require that two-thirds of the mem-
bers of parliament vote in favor of dissolution, and Niedersachsen re-
quires support by two-thirds of the members present, providing that
191. E. LiKHOVSKY, ISRAEL'S PARLIAMENT 32 (1971).
192. Id. at 34.
193. Hofling, Das Institut der Parlamentsaufl$sung in den deuixhen Landenerfaxsungen,
1982 D6V 889.
194. Id. at 890.
195. Id. The relevant texts from the constitutions of the L2nder can be found in Wolf&
von Welck, supra note 47, at 165-76.
196. Hofling, supra note 163, at 890. Note that in practice, the Lander have used the
dissolution mechanism as a last resort in case of extreme difficulty in consolidating a major-
ity in the legislature.
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this number is at least a majority of all members.197
In considering the adoption of a self-dissolution amendment to the
Bonn Constitution, the Federal Republic will have to address two ma-
jor issues. One question involves the quorum required for passage of a
motion for dissolution. The other issue is the definition of the situa-
tions under which dissolution may occur.
The majority of critics who have commented on the subject seem
to agree that the two-thirds majority requirement is necessary to pre-
vent the majority in parliament from abusing the institution.198 The
members of the Enqute Commission preferred the two-thirds require-
ment to prevent the government from following the Austrian practice
of dissolving the parliament in order to have an election at its conven-
ience. 199 The Enqusre Commission also feared that a permissive stan-
dard for self-dissolution would permit the government to submit issues
to the voters, thus introducing elements of direct democracy into the
German representative democracy scheme."°
A further means of protecting the minority is the requirement that
the motion for dissolution be supported by one-fourth of the members
of the Bundestag. The Enqu&re Commission felt that this restriction
would force discussion of the dissolution issue, particularly in the case
where a majority of the members of the Bundestag were against disso-
lution.201 Some commentators have suggested the further restriction
that the one-fourth of the Bundestag members supporting the motion
for dissolution should consist of deputies from all the parties repre-
sented in the Bundestag, as an additional means of protecting the mi-
nority from abuse by the majority.202
Defining the factual circumstances under which self-dissolution
procedures may be invoked present more difficulty than does the issue
of quorum requirements. One commentator has remarked that there is
no need to impose normative requirements for self-dissolution because
the deputies will not willingly face loss of their seats without careful
197. Id. Self-dissolution of a Land parliament has taken place twice since the formation
of the Federal Republic. The parliament in Niedersachsen was dissolved in 1969-1970 after
a crisis in the government as was the parliament in West Berlin in 1981. In some of the
Lander, dissolution by popular referendum is possible; the parliament in the Saarland was
dissolved in this way in 1953. Id. at 889.
198. See, e.g., Bull, supra note 69, at 204; Schenke, supra note 9, at 2528.
199. Enqugte Report, supra note 49, at 41.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Gusseck, supra note 173, at 724.
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consideration.2 °3 In his view, the requirement that dissolution be sup-
ported by a vote of two-thirds of the deputies is ample protection from
abuses by the majority. °4
The Enqute Commission's self-dissolution proposal did not fore-
see a broadening of the institution of dissolution into the discretionary
tool that exists in most other parliamentary systems. Self-dissolution
was perceived as a method of resolving the situations which had arisen
in 1966 and 1972, in which the tension between the government and
opposition had become such that the majority could no longer effec-
tively govern. Self-dissolution was not to be used to refer questions to
the general public for approval, nor was it to be used as a means of
"legitimizing" a chancellor elected by a constructive vote of no-confi-
dence.20 5 Like the procedures in article 68, self-dissolution would be
an emergency escape route from stalemated situations, placed in the
hands of the Bundestag instead of in the hands of the chancellor or
president to maintain the balance of power between the executive and
legislative branches. The chancellor's competence to dissolve would re-
main limited to the constraints of articles 63 and 68. It was feared that
broadening the chancellor's power to dissolve the Bundestag would
make the executive branch too powerful.2'
One critic has expressed concern that adopting the Enqu~te Com-
mission's proposal without considering the changes brought about by
the Constitutional Court's interpretation of article 68 will result in a
shifting of the power relationships among the governmental organs
contrary to the intent of the Bonn Constitution's drafters.20 7 In this
critic's view, the court's decision leaves the chancellor with virtually
unlimited discretion in requesting dissolution of the Bundestag, be-
cause it measures instability in the government according to the chan-
cellor's subjective perception rather than by objective, external criteria.
Adding a right to dissolve by a two-thirds majority in the Bundestag
will do little to resolve the confusion unless some attempt is made to
clarify the circumstances under which the chancellor can request disso-
lution. This commentator also feels that the constructive vote of no
confidence may be affected by the changes in the dissolution provi-
sions, and that this too will have to be considered. 208
203. Bull, supra note 69, at 203-04.
204. Id.
205. EnquNte Report, supra note 49, at 40-41.
206. Id.
207. Gusseck, supra note 173, at 724.
208. Id.
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The above issues are all serious concerns which will have to be
considered by the government before it adopts any constitutional
amendment. For the foreign observer, the dissolution controversy
reveals much about the contemporary West German political climate.
The dispute can be seen as a product of Germany's experience with
National Socialism. The unusually restrictive dissolution provisions
were designed to avoid the perceived flaws in the Weimar Constitution,
and loosening of the restrictions now is viewed skeptically as a return
to the conditions which allowed the National Socialists to take over the
government. In some sense, a loosening of the legal restrictions on the
political process will be a measure of the growth of West German con-
fidence in its postwar political institutions and in the political process
itself. West Germany is changing. A generation brought up with dem-
ocratic political institutions and with no direct personal experience with
National Socialism is making itself felt on the political scene.20 9 This
generation may wish to participate more directly in West Germany's
"representative democracy," and fulfillment of this desire will necessi-
tate some constitutional change.
This controversy has also illustrated the limits of legal control over
the political process. Some decisions-such as whether a governing
political coalition can continue to operate effectively-can be classified
as "legal" or "illegal" only with great difficulty. Such decisions require
the exercise of judgment regarding power relationships and social val-
ues which can be ill-defined in a legal context and which do not easily
lend themselves to measurement with a judicial yardstick. The law
cannot bring political stability to a situation where there is no basic
consent to the legal and political order on the part of the citizens of a
nation and their leaders. The law also cannot provide trustworthy
political leaders. When a leader with sufficient strength wishes to upset
the political system, this can be done either by circumventing the law or
by using it to achieve the leader's own means. In short, the effective
functioning of a democratic society demands a measure of mutual
agreement and trust on the part of both citizens and their leaders.
These intangible factors cannot be forced into existence by legal schol-
ars and judges. In the years since World War II, the West Germans
have been fortunate to have a stable political system and capable polit-
ical leaders committed to the democratic process. Perhaps the current
controversy reflects that they are just now beginning to be aware of this
fact.
209. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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